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This thesis examines Torrijismo's legacy and impact on the
Public Force's professionalization and institutionalization in an
attempt to ascertain prospects for the successful demilitarization
of Panamanian politics.
As a result of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, 21 years of
military dominance in Panama ended. The Panamanian military and
police institution, the Panamanian Defense Force, was dismantled
and replaced with a new organization known as the Public Force. Due
to its large complement of former PDF members, the Public Force
has been faced by civilian suspicion and mistrust . Public Force
attempts at professionalization and institutionalization have been
opposed for fear that Panama's armed institution will once again
intervene in politics.
Dissatisfaction with the civilian government, and the increasing
political clout of Torrijismo's political party, the Democratic
Revolutionary Party, forebodes a new Torrijista, PRD-Public Force,
political alliance. Based on this analysis, the author recommends
that the United States delegate its mentor role to politically neutral
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Operation Just Cause," the December 1989 U.S. military
intervention in Panama, was viewed by a majority of Panamanians as
a liberation from more than two decades of military rule. By
defeating the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) militarily, the U.S.
destroyed Panama's dominant political actor and dismantled the hated
and feared dictatorship of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. 1 Despite
the defeat of Panama's military institution and the installation of
civilian rule, the prospect for the long-term survival of civilian rule
in Panama is unclear.
In response to the chaotic period of rampant crime and civil
disorder during the aftermath of the invasion, the newly-appointed
government of President Guillermo Endara Gallimany chose to create
another armed government organization, known as the Public Force, to
assume the public security duties of the defunct PDF. Although
formally under civilian authority, the Public Force has been met by
widespread public suspicion and mistrust due to its formation around
a core of former PDF members. Civilian apprehension centers on the
1Devroy, Ann and Tyler, Patrick, "U.S. Forces Crush Panamanian Military;
Noriega on the Run," Washington Post, reported in Information Services Latin America
(ISLA) 1989, Volume 39, Number 6, p. 108, 21 December 1989.
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fear that the Public Force will conspire to regain the military
institution's former position of political dominance. 2
The Endara government's campaign of national demilitarization and
reorganization has left the Public Force severely weakened and in
disarray, but the Public Force potential for threatening and
endangering civilian rule remains high. As the Public Force
reestablishes itself as a police force, the need for a professional
identity and the development of institutional character will likely
focus on its status as an armed institution. An organizational
identity is crucial in instilling the sense of duty and cohesiveness
necessary for the Public Force to effectively carry out its duties. The
necessity for this sense of mission and institutional character is
exacerbated by the bitterness and low morale of the Public Force
resulting from the destruction of the military institution during the
invasion, as well as Panamanian society's mistrust, lack of respect,
and negative perception of the Public Force since its creation. The
character of the Public Force identity will ultimately influence the
permanence and stability of civilian rule in Panama.
This thesis examines the prospects for the successful transition
of the PDF to an apolitical Public Force in the context of military rule
in Panama under the late General Omar Torrijos Herrera 1968-81. The
thesis of this paper is that Torrijismo will serve as the defining
concept of the attempt to professionalize the Public Force. The
2Koster,K.M., "In Panama We're Rebuilding Frankenstein," New York Times,
reported in Information Services Latin America (ISLA),Volume 39, Number 6, p. 228,
29 December 1989.
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"new" Public Force institution will endeavor to return to the old days
of Torrijismo to achieve its institutional cohesion, strength, and
identity. The implications of this renewed institutional character
will be a strengthened and cohesive armed institution, and the
emergence of the Public Force as a potentially strong political actor,
likely to be drawn into Panama's unstable civilian political scenery.
As such, the resurgence of Torrijismo in the Public Force will
negatively affect the present demilitarization and future stability of
civilian rule in Panama.
This research is relevant to the broader issue of transitions from
military to civilian rule in Latin America. Unlike the other reversals
of military rule in Latin America since 1980, Panama presents the
unique case where the formerly dominant military institution has
been totally dismantled. 3  Despite this difference, Panama's
potentially serious threat to civilian dominance from its armed
institution is common to Argentina, Chile, Peru, and other Latin
American countries.
In this thesis, the research will be approached through a
chronology of related questions making a case for the relevance of
Torrijismo in post-invasion politics and in the transition of the
Public Force. First, how was Torrijismo able to transcend opposition
31n the case of Grenada, the dismantled People's Revolutionary Army was only a
fledgling military force, hardly comparable to the Panamanian Defense Force, making the
dismantling of the PDF the unique case of demilitarization in Latin America in the 1980s.
Vasquez, Juan, "Military Leader of Island Coup Reported Seized," Los Angeles Times, 31
October 1983, reported in Information Services Latin America (ISLA) 1983, p. 266,
Volume 27, Number 4.
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to its military origins and create one of the most durable legacies of
military rule in Latin America? Second, what is the contrast in the
military institution between Torrijo's tenure and the Noriega years?
Third, what are the current prospects for demilitarization and the
transition of the Public Force to an apolitical force? Fourth, what is
the relationship between Torrijismo and the Public Force in civilian
politics and what will be its impact on the survival of civilian rule in
Panama? And finally, what should the U.S. response be?
4
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TORRIJISMO
A. ORIGINS AND IDEALS
Torrijismo as a national movement can be traced to the undisputed
13-year tenure of Omar Torrijos Herrera as the leader of Panama.
Torrijos won a power struggle for leadership of the military
following a bloodless military coup in October 1968 that overthrew
Arnulfo Arias' civilian government. Torrijos assumtion of the mantle
of leadership marked a watershed period in Panamanian history, the
effects of which continue to impact the nation two decades after his
death.
Born on 13 February 1929 in Santiago, Veraguas Province to
middle class parents, Torrijos attended the Salvadoran Military
Academy between 1947 and 1952 and joined the Panamanian National
Guard, Panama's military and police force, in 1952. By the 1960s he
was a senior officer assigned to the headquarters staff in charge of
the National Guard's Civic Action program tasked with the
improvement and development of the rural infrastructure. He
regularly toured the Panamanian countryside in performance of his
duties and developed numerous contacts that would eventually prove
useful in legitimizing the National Guard's rule, as well as broadening
his personal base of support. Torrijos' adeptness at coalition building
allowed Torrijismo to transcend its military origins and become a
widely supported national movement. The populist appeal and
inclusionary character of Torrijismo became so successful that major
5
segments of groups that initially opposed military rule ultimately
became part of Torrijismo's coalition. Torrijismo's continuing
influence in civilian society has direct implications for the
transformation of the Public Force to an apolitical force.
Torrijismo was never drafted into a doctrinal statement of
ideology. It can best be described as a combination of Torrijos'
personal views, and the progressive social orientation of the National
Guard. It was a unique combination of socialism, populism, and
Panamanian nationalism aimed at improving conditions for the
traditionally economically marginalized and politically e,:-.uded
segment of the Panamanian population. Its dominant theme was a
repudiation and correction of Panama's traditional political,
economic, and social status quo that was believed to cause the
tremendous social and economic inequalities existent in Panama.
Torrijismo collectively disowned not only the traditional elite who
maintained the system and with it perpetuated the inequality, but
also all the members of the system, the oligarchical Conservatives
and Liberals, as well as the radicalized Socialist and Communists.
Torrijismo was an eclectic movement, as Torrijos had studied the
works of Peruvian revolutionary Jos6 Maria Mariategui, Karl Marx, and
learned first hand from Spanish refugee teachers about Spanish
fascism's radical social experiment in Spain. Torrijos' admiration for
the 1968 military coup in Peru and his implementation of collective
farms and other radical reforms in Panamanian society have been
described as proof of his leftist leanings, but closer examination
reveals genuine non-ideological reasons for many of his actions. In a
6
letter to U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy describing his involvement in
counterinsurgency as a junior officer, Torrijos reflected:
I was ...most convinced that these young slain guerillas were
not the real cause but rather the symptom of discontent ... if I had
not been wearing a uniform, I would have joined them. This is
where my determination arose that if one day I would direct our
Armed Forcas, I would unite them with the best interests of our
country. 4
In a later telegram to President Richard Nixon, Torrijos stated
that included in his basic principles was the "...total repudiation of
communism and all other extremist ideologies..." and that Panama's
development programs would "...identify completely with the
philosophy of the Alliance For Progress."5 , the wake of a 1969
counter-coup that almost unseated him, Torrijos moved to establish a
base of support in order to maintain power by implementing reforms
that addressed both the inequality and built support for Torrijismo.
Reformist policies also reflected the times, as the U.S. Alliance for
Progress funds could be used to finance reform projects. 6
Torrijismo's mishmash of ideology eventually evolved into a broad-
based movement, as many formerly excluded segments of Panamanian
society gained inclusion in national politics through membership in
the coalition of Torrijismo and the National Guard.
4Dinges, John, Our Man in Panama, p. 35, Random House Inc, 1990.
5Kempe, Frederick, Divorcing the Dictator, p. 71, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1990.
6 Ropp, Steve, C., Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Country to National Guard,
1968-1975, p.48, Westview Press Inc., 1986.
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An additional aspect of Torrijismo's reformist character was the
historical context in which his generation of National Guard officers
were trained to perceive their mission and role in society. With the
world in the midst of the Cold War, continuous U.S. training and
influence on the National Guard focused on the prevention of another
Cuba in Latin America. U.S. training stressed the link between
military security and economic development as a means to counter
inequality along with the role of social justice in preventing
revolutionary political violence. In this context, despite their
reformist orientation, the majority of the National Guard's officers
were strongly anti-communist, and highly suspicious of the political
left. Torrijos had had extensive training in U.S. military facilities in
the Canal Zone and fit this prototype. As a junior officer, Torrijos
was one of the first Panamanian officers to gain actual combat
experience in counterinsurgency against guerillas infiltrated into
Panama from Cuba.
Despite the National Guard's traditional student role with its U.S.
military teacher, another significant hallmark of Torrijismo was the
opposition to continued U.S. presence in the Canal Zone and meddling
in Panamanian affairs. Long a focal point of Panamanian-American
relations, under Torrijos the Panamanian desire to gain sovereign
control of the Panama Canal was internationalized in order to force
serious U.S. attention to the issue. Torrijos also believed that the U.S.
had been behind the 1969 counter-coup to overthrow him and this was
reflected in Torrijismo's anti-American rhetoric and attempts to
show Panamanian independence from American influence in the
8
international arena. Eventually Torrijismo came to symbolize
Panamanian nationalism, as Torrijos' efforts resulted in the 1977
Panama Canal Treaties that won the Republic of Panama sovereignty
of the Panama Canal and a termination date for the U.S. enclave
presence in Panama. Nationalistic credibility also enhanced
Torrijismo's transition from a military movement to one with more
civilian support as Torrijos' successful negotiation of the Panama
Canal Treaties had accomplished in ten years what generations of
oligarchic civilian governments had been unable to do.
Torrijismo has been described as the only movement in
Panamanian history to successfully encompass and create a balance
between black and white, left and right, rich and poor, military and
civilian. Torrijismo's primary success resulted from its ability to
unite into a single movement, groups traditionally opposed to each
other, such as university students and the National Guard, labor and
the economic elite. The legacy of Torrijismo's pervasiveness with the
various groups of Panamanian society is clearly evident in Panama
today, and will probably remain so for years to come. As a result of
Torrijismo's inclusionary, populist policies, substantial social,
political, and economic advancements were achieved in Panama
between 1968-81, especially benefiting the marginalized and
excluded segments of the population. Under Torrijismo the military
institution served as the transmission belt for these progressive
changes.
The return to political dominance of the elite through the U.S.-
installed government has created a perception that the advancements
9
of Torrijismo are being halted and reversed. However, the military
institution's long affinity with marginal groups makes the Public
Force a likely guarantor of Torrijismo's reforms. In addition, the
patronage character of Panamanian politics is conducive to Public
Force participation in politics. The current civilian adherents of
Torrijismo also remain politically significant and organized enough to
influence the Public Force's outlook on political participation. In
order to understand this relationship, however, it is relevant to
examine Torrijismo's past role in society. In order to measure and
understand the present significance of Torrijismo it is necessary to
briefly examine the scope and character of Torrijos' support in the
previous years, as well as the long-term changes achieved because of
Torrijismo, and its nexus with Panamanian militarism.
B. RISE TO DOMINANCE
Until 1968, there were three centers of power in Panama, the
presidential palace, the rabiblanco7 oligarchy, and the U.S. Embassy.
Due to the importance of business supporting the Panama Canal and
the U.S. enclave Canal Zone, Panama was maintained as a
businessman's (as opposed to banana) republic. Civilian presidents
originating from the elite class succeeded one another in office
7Ropp, Steve, C.,"Panama After the Invasion: Prospects For
Democratization,"paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science
Association, San Francisco, California, 30 August-2 September 1990. Rabiblanco,
literally "white buts" (sic) or "white tails" refers to the white Panamanian upper class
vis-a-vis the rabiprietos or "brown buts" (sic) or non-white Panamanian lower and
middle class.
10
usually with the approval of the incumbent. Even the single president
from the ranks of the National Guard, Jose Antonio Remon was of elite
origins. Political violence was rare8 as Remon was the only president
assassinated in office. This tradition of white executives of European
descent, was in stark contrast to the 90% black and mestizo
population of more than two million Panamanians.
Regular elections were held, and Panama was regarded as a
democracy, but vote rigging by the incumbent party was taken for
granted. An election "victory" was a margin of votes so large the
incumbent government's Electoral Tribunal could not annul the vote as
General Manuel Antonio Noriega did in 1989. The common saying was,
"Its not who wins that counts, but who counts that wins."9 Corruption
was endemic but arguably conditions were not as severe as in some
other parts of Latin America. Panama's excellent infrastructure and
its first rate modern medical, educational, and communications
facilities made her the envy of much of Latin America. Much of
Panama was up to U.S. standards, a result of her long relationship
with the United States The poor were less hopeless, the rich less
baronial, the elite less lilly white, and the military less repressive.'0
Panamanians seemed to have a lower threshold for violence so
differences, including political, were routinely settled through the
transactional cutting of a deal. Politics consisted more of different




business interests than recognizable ideologies. The threat from
communism during the height of the Cold War, so tangible in much of
Latin America, was limited to the several hundred leftist members of
the Party of the People, predominantly intellectuals at the University
of Panama. Labor unions were weak, campesinos lacked effective
organization, and the Roman Catholic Church had a long tradition of
noninvolvement in national politics. Panama's rabiblanco dominated
political, economic, and social life, centered around the transit zone
and U.S. presence and investment.
By the 1960s, the wave of increased social urgency in the Western
Hemisphere led by the U.S. Alliance. for Progress and the related fear
of another Cuba in Latin America caused even the socially bankrupt
oligarchy to initiate token actions to ease social inequity. President
Roberto Chiari, of the Liberal Party, attempted a low-cost housing
program funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, but
when his Liberal successor, Marco Robles, proposed economic reforms
to tax oligarchy-owned business, the Liberal Party split over the
issue. In 1968, partly because of the Liberal Party disunity, twice-
elected and deposed Arnulfo Arias again was elected to the
presidency, due to his sheer charisma with the general population
rather than political ideology or organization. An anti-militarist, he
had tried to weaken the National Guard, and disenfranchise many non-
white and non-mestizo Panamanians in the past. Though personally
popular, his open admiration of European fascism during his first term
in 1940, had led to his overthrow by the National Guard in 1941, with
U.S. government approval. Reelected in 1948, he was impeached after
12
attempting to alter the constitution and impose authoritarian rule.
His final presidency in 1968 lasted only 11 days before he was again
deposed and exiled by the National Guard.
C. THREE PHASES OF CONSOLIDATION
The 1968 overthrow of Arias was the event that brought Torrijos
into national power. Bitter from his previous unseatings, Arias
assumed office on 1 October 1968 and attempted to remove the two
most senior officers of the National Guard. On 11 October, while
President Arias was out with his mistress, the National Guard again
deposed him.11 The National Guard coup was a response to outside
interference in the military institution's internal structure. As a
result, the provisional junta that took power was unprepared to
cohesively run the government. The junta's initial manifesto clearly
illustrated this lack of direction, and even favored the quick return to
civilian rule. 12 Inside the National Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Torrijos
emerged as the new commander determined to maintain power and
build public support for military rule.
In attempting to expand his following and coopt opposition to the
military coup, Torrijos froze the price of basic food stuffs and rents,
and diverted funds from the National Assembly to the University of
Panama to placate militant students. The latter attempt failed and
11 Panama: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
Fourth Edition, p. 43, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
12Panamanian Politics, p. 38.
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resulted in the National Guard occupation of the University of Panama.
Eventually the National Assembly was disbanded and the University of
Panama closed for several months while its faculty and student body
were purged.13
In January 1969 another power struggle ensued between Colonel
Torrijos as Commander in Chief of the National Guard and Lieutenant
Colonel Boris Martinez, his second in command. The brash Martinez,
without Torrijos' prior concurrence, announced a national agrarian
reform program that alarmed land owners and entrepreneurs.
Martinez's proposals to discontinue using the National Guard to
prevent national demonstrations also alarmed the U.S. residents of the
Canal Zone. Memories of the bloody 1964 riots that occurred when
Panamanian students attempted to raise the Panamanian flag in Canal
Zone, and the lack of support by the National Guard resulting in
violence between the U.S. military and Panamanian students, placed
U.S. support behind the more moderate Torrijos. 14 Torrijos prevailed
and Martinez was exiled to the United States.
While not denouncing the proposed reforms, Torrijos sought to
assure Panamanian and foreign investors, especially the United
States, that their interests were not threatened. But in order to
thwart potential criticism that he was a pawn of the United States,
Torrijos quickly adopted some symbolic left-of-center policies and
causes such as support for Cuba's Castro. While keeping key leaders
13 Panama: A Country Study, p. 44.
14 Panamanian Politics, p. 40.
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of the Communist Party and militant student organizations
imprisoned, scores of other leftists were released. Leftist student
activists were appointed to the Agrarian Reform Institute, a
government agency, while a gesture to urban masses and labor was
also made by appointment of Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, a black
lawyer long tied to organized labor, to the post of Minister of Labor.15
Torrijos' efforts at establishing a mass base of support among the
majority of non-white Panamanians alarmed the white oligarchy that
had traditionally ruled Panama. Perceiving the prospects of continued
military rule as a direct threat to their dominance, the oligarchy
attempted to reinstate themselves. While Torrijos, by then a
Brigadier General, was on vacation in Mexico in December 1969, a
counter-coup led by two National Guard colonels was attempted in
order to depose him. The goals were to move away from Torrijos'
leftist oriented policies, and return Panama to the pre-1968
dominance of the oligarchy. Torrijos was informed by his overthrow
by telephone, and the coup plotters assumed control of the country,
confident that Torrijos' location precluded any opposition to the coup.
No troops were alerted or deployed against any possible action.
Fortunately for Torrijos, other members of the elite supported him, as
Fernando Eleta, a member of the traditional elite and former foreign
minister who had accompanied him to Mexico, used his contacts in the
U.S. to establish direct communication between Torrijos and loyalist
officers in Panama under the command of Major Manuel Antonio
1 5 1bid.
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Noriega.1 6  Torrijos was able to arrange his return to Panama to
confront the counter-coup. His popularity and support were such that
news of his presence in Panama allowed him to regain power without
firing a shot.
While the collusion of the military counter-coup plotters with the
oligarchy was unique, given the military's traditional progressive
outlook, the immediate, albeit short-lived reversal of some of
Torrijismo's actions during the counter-coup clearly underscored the
severity of Panama's volatile social divisions of race, and class. In
creating his base of support, Torrijos had appointed two blacks to
cabinet level positions, only the second and third ever in Panama's
history. One of the first acts of the counter-coup was the immediate
replacement of the two black cabinet members, Materno Vasquez and
R6mulo Escobar Bethancourt despite the retention of the rest of
Torrijos' cabinet. With the coup put down, Torrijos set about
restructuring the upper echelons of the National Guard and government
as well as moderating the leftist drift of his rule. Bethancourt and
Vasquez were retained, but in less visible government positions.
To understand this interaction between race and politics, it is
necessary to understand the relationship between race, ethnicity, and
social class in Panamanian society. The social structure is stratified
into four basic classes. The perception of status in descending order
can be broken down as follows:
16Dinges, p. 68.
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1) a predominantly white economic and political oligarchy at the
top;
2) a racially mixed middle class, but traditionally dependent on
the oligarchy for employment;
3) a marginal mulatto, mestizo, and black population;
4) rural peasants and farmers at the bottom. 17
Until the 1968 coup, the National Guard was excluded from
political participation by what it perceived as an alliance between
the white upper class and the U.S. The National Guard naturally was
drawn into an alignment with the other excluded groups of
Panamanian society. The understandable affinity between the
military institution and the non-white sectors eventually was
formalized by inclusion in Torrijismo's populist coalition.
Establishment of Torrijismo as a national movement not
surprisingly occurred during the tenure of Torrijos' rule. Unlike most
of Latin America, military rule under Torrijos years was not marked
by brutal repression of opponents, but alliance and coalition building
with various sectors of Panamanian society. Torrijos envisioned a
movement that would force beneficial changes for the majority of
Panamanians and that meant addressing the needs of Panama's
marginalized population. Three distinct periods during the Torrijos
years can be distinguished by the changing relations between Torrijos
and his various constituents. Differing degrees of political
17Priestly, George, Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama, p.
7, Westview Special Studies on Latin America, 1986.
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institutionalization and closeness between Torrijos and his
supporters characterized these periods as he avoided dependence on
any one group. However, despite the changing relationship with
various groups, he never alienated any of his supporters by diluting
the gains of one group for another. His alliances were highly
successful due to delivery of tangible benefits to his supporters. This
significantly contributed to the steady growth of his already wide
constituency. In the 1970s the strength of Torrijismo was
impressive. Questionable elements of the National Guard and other
constituent groups were purged, while new supporters such as the
middle class were won over by new jobs with the expanding
government bureaucracy. 18
The significance of Torrijismo's phased consolidation of power
was in its success in generating lasting bases of support in the
disparate groups of Panamanian society. The differing character of
the three phases illustrates Torrijismo's approach to creating a
support base that made Torrijismo a civilian movement instead of a
purely military one. The thirteen year span of three phases further
reflect Torrijismo's importance as the legacy of its broad coalition,
although more dispersed and fragmented at present, accounts for the
wide presence of Torrijismo in the various sectors of Panama today.
18 Panama: A Country Study, p. 46.
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1. Phase One 1968-72
Phase one, the period from 1968-1972, was one of ad hoc
coalition building with all sectors of Panamanian society, as Torrijos
endeavored to find a workable combination of foreign and domestic
polices that would minimize complaints from the United States,
increase his popularity, and legitimize the National Guard's role in
government. Torrijos endeavored to create political groups not tied
or beholden to the U.S. or the oligarchy. Torrijos' model of a popular
base was one comprised of alliances between the National Guard, with
Torrijos as its commander, and the various sectors of Panamanian
society that had been traditionally excluded by the oligarchy. Despite
his strong charisma and popularity, the aim was never a cult of
personality but establishment of an ongoing, progressive movement in
order to achieve social and political equality with the oligarchy, as
well as improved economic conditions for the marginalized sectors of
society. Torrijos governed through decree, and any influence on
national policy was through him. While there was a civilian
president, the National Assembly had been abolished and all political
parties were banned.
a. Constituents of Torrijismo: Oligarchy
The 1968 presidential elections resulted in a Liberal Party
division over support of Arnulfo Arias. Prior to the elections, a group
of Liberal party t~cnicos highly influential in the incumbent
government's Ministry of Treasury, National Bank, and Ministry of
Planning, wanted to implement economic reform policies. Reforms
were being recommended by the U.S. administration as a prerequisite
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to receiving aid under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress.' 9
More conservative Liberals, with substantial amounts to lose from the
proposed economic reforms, allied themselves against the t6cnicos
and with Arias, who also opposed the reforms. With Arias' election
triumph, the t~cnico group lost all their influence over government
policy.
Following the 1968 exile of Arias, Torrijos recruited the
t6cnicos by promising to implement their economic reform programs
and appointing them to influential positions in his government.
Thcnico-owned and related businesses also profited from government
contracts awarded to them by Torrijos. Implemented by the Ministry
of Planning, the reforms were primarily aimed at reducing rural-urban
migration, increasing domestic agricultural production, and revising
tax legislation in order to increase government revenue. The first
two goals were consistent with Torrijismo and resulted in U.S.
Alliance for Progress funds financing many of Torrijos' development
and reform projects. The third was not incompatible with Tcrr;iismo
and generated much needed tax revenue for the government. While the
relationship with the t~cnicos established an important base of
support for Torrijismo in the oligarchy, most of the oligarchy never
reconciled their displacement from power, many were also bitter
about financing the regime through new taxes aimed at the well to do.
Prior to the coup, most of Panama's businesses were tax exempt. The
19Panamanian Politics, p. 62.
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new legislation cancelled this exemption and imposed substantial
taxes on the private sector.
The Torrijos-t6cnico partnership had greater implications
for Panama's economic future as it laid the groundwork for its
emergence as a regional finance center. Panama was opened up to
international banking in order to diversify the economy away from the
traditional dependence on the Panama Canal and the Colon Free Zone,
the idea of t6cnico Minister of Planning, Ardito Barletta. 2 0 The
international banking community was attracted by Panama's unique
combination of political stability, well educated work force, and
liberal banking regulations. Under Torrijos the banking regulations
were further liberalized in favor of customers, as secrecy of
transactions was guaranteed, and limits on currency transactions
were outlawed.
Only Panama's Banking Commission could inspect banks
while disclosure of information regarding customers was declared
illegal. 2 1  Dozens of foreign banks and multinationals flocked to
Panama and created hundreds of jobs, while hundreds of millions of
dollars were invested or spent in the local economy. Offshore bank
holdings eventually peaked at $47 billion dollars.22 With domestic
capital and business ownership concentrated in the hands of the
oligarchy, this period proved a prosperous one for the oligarchy
20Panama: A Country Study, p. 148.
21 Ibid.
2 2 1bid., p. 150.
21
regardless of political persuasion, defusing many criticisms of
Torrijos as a leftist and anti-oligarchy. Still, the majority of the
oligarchy was never reconciled to their loss of national political
hegemony.
With the exception of the t6cnicos' expanded roles, Torrijos
followed a policy of non-confrontation with the oligarchy while
creating his broad-based populist alliance. His disregard had left the
majority of the oligarchy with no voice in national politics. With
political parties officially banned after the 1968 coup, loosely
organized interest groups became the primary forum for articulation
of elite concerns but had little clout. By the mid-1970s external and
domestic factors led to an economic downturn in Panama as
decreasing traffic through the Panama Canal due to the end of the
Vietnam War, international recession and inflation, coupled with the
expensive agrarian reform programs and strong pro-labor policies. As
in much of the rest of the world, Panama's rate of inflation increased,
and the economic stagnation forced Torrijos to deal with the growing
criticism from the economic elite and their interest groups.
In 1974, Torrijos established a special office within the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to address the numerous and valid
complaints. The National Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP)
increasingly became one voice of elite interests and criticisms of
Torrijos. Sensing their momentum due to the economic conditions,
the oligarchy through CONEP proposed easing of the conditions of the
1972 Labor Code in order to revive productivity. Always respectful of
the oligarchy's crucial role in Panama's economic welfare, Torrijos
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negotiated with the leaders of CONEP and his labor supporters to
achieve a compromise solution on the 1972 Labor Code, without
sacrificing the previous gains for labor. As a result of the
negotiations, Torrijos decreed a 1976 law modifying the 1972 Labor
Code in the context of the economic crisis that addressed the
business elite's desires. Existing labor contracts were extended for
two years, effectively reducing wages due to inflation. New
businesses were exempted from labor contracts during the first years
of operations resulting in the creation of "new" business from old
companies to avoid organized labor, and the right to strike was
modified to be permissible only in circumstances not negatively
affecting the profits of a company.23
By 1977, another organization representing elite interests,
the Annual Conference of Business Executives (CADE), encouraged by
the perception of increased leverage with Torrijos, attempted go
beyond the economic realm and reassert the oligarchy's role in
directly influencing government policy making. Torrijos himself
reversed his policy of non-confrontation and met directly with CADE,
often debating CADE leaders, with the goal of improving the economic
situation. Simultaneously, an internal debate raged within the elite
over where the focus of the new clout should be. A more conservative
faction of the traditional oligarchy favored a political focus with the
restoration of the old system of party politics and democracy.
Another faction, primarily of business people and newer members of
23Panamanian Politics, p. 64.
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the elite, favored an economic focus tolerant of military rule so long
as economic concerns were met. The latter faction prevailed, and the
oligarchy's opportunity to force an opening for a return to civilian
rule and democracy was abandoned in favor of economic
accommodation with Torrijismo and military rule. This lack of
resolve to pursue democracy revealed the elite's exclusionary
character, more prone to perpetuation of their narrow interests than
of the common welfare.
While the possibility of achieving a successful transition
back to civilian rule and democracy under Torrijos is debatable, a
serious attempt to effect such a change might have eased the current
distrust of the oligarchy-dominated current government. The
oligarchy's compromise of democracy underscores their lack of belief
in the concept and adds validity to criticisms that neither the pre-
1968 nor post-1989 oligarchy dominated systems were democratic.
It is significant to note that the emphasis on democracy in the
oligarchy's platform throughout the 1970s, was due to U.S. pressure,
in return for U.S. support. 24 CADE leaders had even suggested their
participation in the Assembly of Corregimientos in return for
economic concessions from Torrijos. 25
2 4 1bid., p. 65.
2 5Prior to this period, the Assembly of Corregimientos was opposed by the
majority of the oligarchy as an illegal, rubber stamp assembly for the military regime.
By offering to participate in the Assembly of Corregimientos, the oligarchy was attempting
to barter its endorsement of the military regime and Torrijismo in return for economic
concessions from the government.
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The military-t6cnico alliance and the later economic
accommodation between Torrijismo and the commercial elite served
Torrijismo by neutralizing much of the opposition to military rule. It
also allowed Torrijismo to transcend its military origins and
establish itself as a national movement with at least the partial
support and acquiescence of the oligarchy. It must be pointed out,
however, that the majority of the elite never fully reconciled the
political dominance by those they perceived their social, educational,
and racial inferiors.
b. Labor
Among Torrijos' first overtures, in 1969, were to organized
labor. This area was especially important to Torrijismo in that it had
dual implications for domestic and foreign policy. Labor's domestic
significance was its traditional exclusion from national affairs,
including labor policy. Labor also provided a foreign policy platform
for Torrijismo's goal of dislodging American influence from all facets
of Panamanian life. Torrijos' goal was a single national labor
confederation. Many Panamanian labor leaders had long sought such an
organization in order to improve working conditions for the majority
of Panamanian workers. The unique history and character of
Panamanian labor, however, had prevented the creation of such an
organization due to powerful opposition by the oligarchy in the
domestic sector and their U.S. allies in the enclave Canal Zone.
In order to construct the Panama Canal and meet the labor
needs in the Canal Zone in the 19th century, a foreign working class
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had been imported into Panama from the Caribbean Antilles.2 6
Predominantly black, Protestant, and English-speaking, this imported
working class had remained apart from Panama's Catholic, Hispanic
native population, especially the dominant white oligarchy. The racial
differences and often menial labor performed by the Antilleans
conveniently fit the Panamanian perception of racial and class
superiority of whites over blacks and further perpetuated the
separation. Over the years, the national perception that the urban
labor force was foreign, and the jurisdictional division between those
employed in the Republic of Panama, and those employed in the Canal
Zone, served as a structural obstacle in the organization of the labor
force. In sole control of the majority of employment opportunities,
the oligarchy and the Canal Zone elite successfully inhibited the
growth of Panamanian labor into a political force, by keeping it
divided.
As the Canal Zone was a territory of the U.S., Panamanians
working in the enclave were organized into U.S. unions. Wages and
benefits were geared to U.S. scales and thus substantially higher than
earned by workers doing comparable work in the Republic of Panama.
Canal Zone labor comprised a labor elite, who with the encouragement
of their U.S. employers, strongly opposed any attempts to unite them
under a single Panamanian labor confederation for fear of losing their
higher wages. The oligarchy also opposed the single confederation as
2 6 Panamanian Politics, p. 55.
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demands for higher wages by their workers would significantly reduce
their profits.
In 1969, the strongest labor organization in Panama was the
Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama (CTRP). Formed in
1956 with the sanction of the United States and Panamanian oligarchy
in order to curb leftist organizing of Panamanian labor, the CTRP
maintained strong ties to the U.S. AFL-CIO. Allied with the oligarchy
and the United States, the CTRP successfully opposed Torrijismo's
attempts to incorporate all Panamanian labor under a single
confederation. Instead, in 1970, Torrijos organized the non-Canal
Zone labor force into an alternative organization, the National Central
of Panamanian Workers (CNTP). By 1978, CTRP membership was at
22,101 while CNTP membership had reached 21,629, and was still
growing. The rapid growth of the CNTP and its close ties to the
communist World Federation of Trade Unions successfully provided
Torrijismo a counterweight to the U.S. and oligarchic-influenced
CTRP. 2 7  Through its new influence, labor used the CNTP to influence
national policy.
Aware of labor's growing potential, along with the CNTP,
Torrijos enacted a new labor code meant to solidify labor's support.
The labor code significantly improved conditions for Panamanian
workers, gave impetus to greater organization of the labor force, as
well as strengthened the appeal of the CNTP's association with
Torrijos as a medium of greater political influence for the labor
271bid., p. 58.
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sector. The Labor Code of 1972 increased the individual worker's job
security, entitlements to benefits, and level of overall bargaining
power. Additionally it strengthened the power of the unions by
creating a superior labor tribunal for the settlement of labor issues.
The code required obligatory collective agreements between business
and their workers, and implemented payroll deduction of union dues.28
In 1971, Torrijos had issued a decree that required a payment to all
workers of an extra months salary each year known as the "13th
month bonus." With these measures, Torrijos considerably added to
the general support and overall momentum of Torrijismo.
Torrijos' courting of the labor sector was not without
problems. As the service sector began to expand in the 1970s
Torrijos was caught between his policy of noninterference in
economic issues and the growing expectations of his labor supporters.
Under Torrijos, Panama was rapidly becoming a regional center for
international banking, transportation, and communications. Organized
labor was pressing for labor organization of the service sector, which
would have stymied continued investment by foreign multinational
companies that were financing Panama's service center development.
Torrijos opposed the organization, 29 and deftly maneuvered to broaden
his support base with the economic elite. Benefiting from the
expansion of the service sector, and therefore from Torrijismo, a
considerable segment of the economic elite was willing to reach an
2 8 panama: A Country Study, pp. 47, 139.
2 9 Panamanian Politics, p. 60.
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accommodation with Torrijismo, thereby allowing Torrijos to
decrease his reliance on labor's support while gaining an important
new partner. Yet, Torrijos did not alienate labor by reducing their
previous gains. Even when Torrijos modified the 1972 Labor Code in
response to pressure from the economic elite, the labor sector
remained firmly in support of Torrijismo.
By inclusion of labor into national politics, Torrijos
fundamentally and permanently altered Panama's political system.
Until the 1968 coup, the Panamanian labor movement was totally
subordinated to the oligarchy and the U.S. via the Canal Zone. In
addition, it was purposely kept fragmented to prevent its development
into a national force of any kind. With the formation of the CNTP and
other regime-sanctioned unions, labor actively entered the national
political arena. The subsequent enactment of the favorable 1972
Labor Code represented quick and significant gains of labor under
Torrijismo.
Eventually, progress was made in uniting labor into a single
organization. As Panama assumed jurisdiction over formerly U.S.
responsibilities in accordance with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties,
Panamanians previously in U.S. labor unions were incorporated into
the national labor union. Due to Torrijos' negotiations with the United
States, these workers retained their higher wage while still
benefiting from the national labor union's political clout. Socially,
the formerly separate descendants of the imported black Antillean
labor force were integrated as equal members into a united
Panamanian labor force. These accomplishments further helped
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Torrijismo transcend its military origins and build wide civilian
support.
c. Urban Poor
Torrijos also cultivated support from the marginalized
sectors of both urban and rural society. In the cities, rural to urban
migration in search of better economic opportunities in the transit
zone resulted in burgeoning slums densely packed with original
residents and the new migrants. Due to the increased demand caused
by the migrants, low rent slums such as Chorillo, long the residence
of the Antillean labor force, suddenly faced increasing rents.
Constrained by the border with the Canal Zone on one side and by
Panama City on the other, the slums could not expand, causing the
rural migrants mainly employed in marginal economic activities such
as street vending or as domestics, to create new squatter areas in the
remote areas surrounding Panama City. Most of the occupied land
belonged to the government which instead of evicting them, under
Torrijos implemented policies to allow the squatters to slowly
purchase their housing sites. Essentially rent-free, the squatters
were able to devote large portions of their economic resources to
their mortgages and the improvement of their neighborhoods. Far
from the city limits and the reach of basic services, Torrijos further
allocated government funds to build and upgrade additional low
income housing in the urban slums. He was directly responsible for
infrastructure projects that provided basic services such as potable
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water and electricity to the old slums and new settlements of the
urban poor.30
While these policies succeeded in winning supporters for
Torrijismo, as with the organized labor, the relationship was not
problem free. In one celebrated case, residents of San Miguelito, the
largest shanty town on the outskirts of Panama City, strongly opposed
the 1968 military coup and were among the first Panamanians to
openly demonstrate against the military government. Oddly, the poor
appeared to be in league with the oligarchy versus the military. Upon
further investigation, it became evident that their opposition was the
work of religious clergy and lay leaders, and not due to any misplaced
alliance or sympathy for the oligarchy. In another artful coopting
maneuver, Torrijos diffused San Miguelito's opposition by diverting
attention from national to local politics, emphasizing local
aspirations by proposing the creation of an incorporated district with
political autonomy for San Miguelito. Incorporation would free San
Miguelito from administrative and fiscal control of the district of
Panama. Incorporated, San Miguelito could control its own fiscal
destiny by raising revenue through local taxes and enter in to legal
contracts for loans, 3 1  manage the infrastructure development and
lobby for essential services. Most importantly, incorporation gave
San Miguelito legal political status which entitled it to
representation in the Assembly of Corregimientos, and an entry and
30Panama: A Country Study, p. 107.
3 1Priestley, p. 41.
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voice in national politics. The first free elections since 1968
resulted from incorporation when San Miguelito elected its first
representatives to the Assembly of Corregimientos.
d. Rural Poor
The greatest emphasis of Torrijismo's populist policies was
with the rural populace. Differing from the heterogeneous mix of
races characterizing the urban marginal classes, the rural population
was a largely racially homogeneous population of mestizo peasants
and native Indians. Of rural mestizo origins himself, Torrijos readily
identified with this constituency. Famous for frequent unannounced
helicopter visits to the countryside, Torrijos generated strong
support by tispensing favors to individuals and entire rural
communities. Availing himself of previous ties made during his stint
as head of the National Guard's civic action programs, Torrijos
successfully parlayed his genuine desire to improve the rural
infrastructure into grassroots support for Torrijismo.
But Torrijos' rural affinity did not result in automatic
cooperation and support from the rural population. The National Guard
had traditionally been the oligarchy's tool of repression against other
elements of society such as university students and the peasantry.
Many in the rural population were supporters of the National Guard's
arch-rival, anti-militarist politician Arnulfo Arias. Like the
residents of San Miguelito, many in the countryside opposed the 1968
coup that overthrew Arias. There was even some personal dislike for
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Torrijos as he was famous for having killed students, who were
leading peasant guerillas in Cerro Tute in 1959.32
Torrijismo's policies in the countryside focused on agrarian
reform, land tenure issues, and improved working conditions for
banana plantation labor. Unique in Latin America where the power of
the elite classes was derived from its ownership of land, most
Panamanian fortunes had been centered around commercial activities
in the transit zone, so Torrijos was free on any opposition from a
landed class. The problem in the countryside was that the majority of
campesinos were engaged in subsistence agriculture on plots of land
they did not own, while the growth in cattle ranching was rapidly
limiting the availability of land for agriculture. While the
government owned the majority of land in the countryside, there were
too many landless subsistence campesinos to solve the problem by
simply distributing government land.
To alleviate the land problem, Torrijos adopted a system of
collective farms or asentamientos to be the focal point of his land
reform program. Landless campesinos and small landowners were
organized to pool resources and labor in attempting to maximize
efficiency and output. Despite substantial government resources
allotted to the asentamientos and introduction of modern methods
such as the use of mechanized equipment, the asentamientos were not
self-supporting. Many accumulated debts for the machinery, causing
3 2 1bid., p. 56.
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members to seek other sources of income to pay debts incurred by the
collective.
Despite the disappointing results of the agrarian reform,
the political aspect of the asentamientos had suzceeded in gaining
more support for Torrijismo. Through establishment of the National
Confederation of Peasant Settlement (CONAC) a government agency
formed to manage the asentamientos, Torrijismo provided the rural
poor a long sought inclusion into national politics. In the process,
Torrijos reached an accommodation with the political left in return
for patronage by appointing the communist Party of the People to the
leadership of CONAC. 3 3 The Party of the People had long been
associated with the campesino issues and had a sizable base of
support. Although Torrijismo and communism were not usually
compatible, they shared common themes such as opposition to the U.S.
presence in Panama, as well as improved conditions for the
campesinos. Through CONAC, the rural population was able to elect
numerous campesino leaders to the Assembly of Corregimientos
resulting in unprecedented, inordinate rural power in national
politics.3 4  In return for Torrijos' political patronage, the Party of the
People, toned down its communist ideology and aggressively promoted
Torrijismo and regularly provided strong peasant support.
Aside from political motivations, Torrijos was genuinely
concerned with the improvement of the rural areas. As in the urban
3 31bid.
34 Panamanian Politics, p. 69.
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slums, he was directly responsible for bringing developmental
infrastructure and improved social conditions to the countryside.
Potable water, community health programs, medical clinics, and
improved sanitation and sewage facilities significantly reduced
infant mortality rates. Panamanian infant mortality went from 68
per 1000 in 1960, to 25 per 1000 in 1984. 3 5 Major improvements of
educational facilities increased the rates of general education
achieved by the campesinos and all Panamanians, as school enrollment
rates for children between six and eleven years of age went from 68
percent in 1960 to 96 percent in 1980.36
Despite his alliances with labor, and the marginalized rural
and urban sectors, Torrijos was careful not to antagonize and alienate
the economic elite. As part of the oligarchy, the economic elite had
been accustomed to dominating the Panamanian economy while the
oligarchic political parties dominated politics. Formed by a coalition
of traditional, wealthy Panamanian families and the well-to-do
descendants of European immigrants, the Liberal Party prior to the
1968 coup had been a dominant force in Panamanian politics.3 7
Successive electoral victories for the Liberal Party had guaranteed
the perpetuation of business and oligarchic interests.
3 5Sheahan, John, Patterns of Development in Latin America, p. 26, Princeton
University Press, 1987.
361bid., p. 38.
3 7 Panamanian Politics, p. 18.
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2. Phase Two 1972-78
Between 1972-76, Torrijos moved to consolidate and formalize
his alliances into a more institutional structure through
accommodations with the elite and marginal sectors of society.
Torrijos envisioned an organization encompassing all the various
groups of Panamanian society patterned after Mexico's Institutional
Revolutionary Party. 38 Organizational problems prevented success of
this idea, as political parties were still officially banned. It was not
until the late 1970s, after the legalization of political parties, that
a government party, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), was
formed.
A new Constitution drafted in 1972 granted Torrijos
extraordinary powers, and designated him as the "Maximum Leader of
the Revolution" charged with coordinating government activities. The
dramatic political and social changes in Panama indeed warranted
description as a revolution. Torrijos was constitutionally empowered
to appoint government ministers, heads of autonomous agencies,
members of the Electoral Tribunal, National Guard officers, and
Supreme Court justices, but the term of his powers was only for six
years, the same length of time as a presidential term. Panama's
constituent legislature, the National Assembly, was banned and
replaced by the Assembly of Corregimientos, a legislature of 505
elected representatives of administrative sub-districts established
during colonial times. The Assembly of Corregimientos provided for
38Panama: A Country Study, p. 45.
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greater representation of the Panamanian population, and due to the
greater proportion of rural corregimientos the oligarchic-dominated
transit zone was given less representation, resulting in the loss of
yet another oligarchic means for political domination. 3 9
3. Phase Three 1978-81
The final phase of Torrijismo's institutionalization ran from
1978-1981 and the General's untimely death. The beginning of this
period was characterized by serious economic difficulties that forced
Torrijos to re-evaluate his policies and the role of the National Guard
in running the nation. Pressure on Torrijos as a result of the
economic problems in part led to a political opening in 1978. In 1978
a constitutional amendment calling for direct presidential elections
in 1984 was signed into law. Torrijos relinquished his extraordinary
powers, appointed a new civilian president, legalized political
parties, and established the PRD as the vanguard party of Torrijismo.
Appointment of a banker to one of the vice presidencies as intended to
signal domestic and international business that the new civilian
government would be pro-business and responsive to their interests.
New investment and commercial activity was crucial in reviving
Panama's ailing economy.
Yet economic motivations were not the sole nor the primary
cause of the political opening. After a decade of Torrijismo, Torrijos
believed that Panama was ready for a gradual return to civilian rule
39Panamanian Politics, p. 42.
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as a democracy characterized by the political integration of formerly
excluded groups. Torrijos' civilianization of the government and
legalization of political parties was a significant step towards the
return of Panama to civilian rule. From 1968-78, the military had
directly run the country, but now they would be returning to the
barracks. An important indicator of the move toward civilian rule
was that Torrijos voluntarily relinquished the constitutionally-
granted extraordinary powers at their expiration in 1978.
Legalization of political parties in anticipation of the
upcoming presidential elections, was bolstered by new legislation
aimed at allowing formation of new political parties. National
politics was being designed by Torrijismo to guarantee all sectors
participation in a pluralistic civilian political environment.
Torrijismo's party, the PRD, was established to fill the void created
by the National Guard's withdrawal from politics. But it was also
during this period that the parties which helped comprise the post
invasion ruling coalition, Arias Calderon's Christian Democrats and
Endara's Panamenistas were able to increase their following relative
to the traditional elite parties of the Liberals and Conservatives.
While the three phases of Torrijismo differ in significant
ways, the common denominator in consolidation was the central
political role of the National Guard. Prior to the 1968 coup, the
National Guard role in national politics had been negligible. Despite
existence of some paramilitary units, its character was
overwhelmingly police-oriented reflecting its dominant mission.
After the coup, through Torrijismo and a growing military character,
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the National Guard, later renamed the Panamanian Defense Forces,
attained total dominance of politics and society. In the wake of the
invasion, the Public Force, the survivors of the PDF have again been
relegated to a subordinate role in Panama. The Public Force's
dissatisfaction with its current status, and attempts to reassert
itself could very well lead to renewed military involvement in
politics.
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III. MILITARIZATION OF PANAMANIAN POLITICS
A. MILITARY INSTITUTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In order to understand the scope of change that the Public Force
represents as well as the origins for the lack of confidence in the
Public Force, a contrast between the traditional role of the military
institution begun under Torrijismo, and that established for the
newly-created Public Force in Panamanian civil-military relations
bears examination. Since the founding of the Panamanian republic in
1903, the military institution has been a key institution called upon
to perform both military and security functions. In a matter of
decades, the military institution rapidly evolved from a purely police
force to the paramilitary National Guard, and later to the military
institution known as the Panamanian Defense Force, explicit with
military and internal security missions. 40
The evolution of the Panamanian military institution appears to
correlate with three periods characterized by differing patterns of
military participation in politics. First, from 1903-31, the National
Police force served as the enforcer of U.S. Canal Zone and elite
Panamanian oligarchical prerogatives in domestic Panamanian
politics. With the withdrawal of overt U.S. participation by the Canal
Zone administrators in domestic Panamanian politics, the National
40 Wesson, R., The Latin American Military Institution, p. 169, Praeger Special
Studies, 1986.
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Police was subordinate solely to prerogatives of the Panamanian
aristocracy, which comprised the ruling political elite. The
development of a cohesive internal National Police organization,
however, produced a leadership intent on institutional development
and participation in the political decision making process on the
national level. 4 1
During the second period, between 1948-1968, the search for an
entry point for military participation in politics became associated
with the adoption of a paramilitary mission and establishment of the
Panamanian National Guard. Between 1948-1953, National Police
Commander Jos6 Antonio Rem6n modernized equipment and training
methods along more military lines, raised salaries and fringe
benefits, and in 1953, created the National Guard from the National
Police.4 2 Trained to be a professional military officer at the Mexican
Military Academy, Rem6' , draamed of a Panamanian national army.
Along with others in the National Police, Rem6n disliked the practice
of "deprofessionalizing" military officers by relegating them to police
duties. Like other officers who entered the National Police after
graduation from a military academy, Rem6n experienced a sense of
status deprivation, that fueled the widespread aspirations for a
national army. These aspirations grew within the ranks of the
4 11bid., p. 170.
42 Panama: A Country Study, p. 34.
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National Police and led to Rem6n's eventual transformation of the
National Police to the National Guard.4 3
Despite the new title, the missions and functions of National
Guard saw little immediate change, but its establishment was a
significant step, reflecting progress toward a national army and an
increased military role in political decision making. The Cold War
international environment of the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the
continued militarization and professionalization of the National Guard
with substantial United States aid under the provisions of the Mutual
Security Act. Military professionalization also saw an increasing
number of National Guard positions. requiring formal military training,
as new public-order units and infantry rifle companies were formed.
Although police work still comprised the majority of National Guard
duties, the institution was gradually professionalized and improved
militarily under the leadership of a small, but increasing core of
Panamanian foreign military academy graduates 44 of which Torrijos
was one. The 1960s resulted in a National Guard confident in its new,
and increasing military role and self-assured of its readiness and
ability to play a greater role in national politics.
The third period, 1968-1989, began when the coup of 1968 firmly
established the Panamanian military as the powerbroker of
Panamanian politics. The former arbiter role played by the National
Guard between feuding factions of civilian political elites gave way
43 Wesson, p. 28.
4 4 1bid., p. 222.
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to the decision making role assumed by the coup's surviving leader,
Torrijos. Torrijos also continued the modernization of the National
Guard in order to improve the potency of the National Guard as a
military force. Simultaneously, Torrijos engineered the National
Guard's direct role in politics, imprinting the legacy of
institutionalized militarism in the National Guard as well as in the
political consciousness of the Panamanian people that continues to
make Torrijismo a part of post-military rule Panama. The belief in
the inevitability of military intervention in politics carried over from
the Panamanian Defense Force remains ingrained in the collective
memory of the Public Force today.
Torrijos exercised control over Panama through tight control of
the National Guard. Formerly an institution of low social esteem and
ignored in traditional national decision making circles, the National
Guard in turn gained prestige and respect under Torrijos, and ruled
Panama through use of the National Guard's highly centralized
command and administrative structure.4 5  Torrijos exercised sole
command over the deployment of all paramilitary units and personally
approved all officer assignments and promotions. The relatively
small size of the National Guard under Torrijos, 5000 men and 465
officers, 46 allowed him to maintain close, personal working
relationships within the National Guard.4 7
45Panamanian Politics, p. 43.
4 61bid.
47Panarna: A Country Study, p. 222.
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B. MILITARY INSTITUTION UNDER TORRIJISMO
Following the 1968 coup, the General Staff exercised political
power and influence second only to Torrijos. While routine decisions
were usually made by civilian government officials during the 1970s
and 1980s, it was not uncommon for important official rulings to be
deferred to members of the General Staff. Even with the return of the
National Guard to the barracks and the resumption of civilian rule,
government ministers often experienced difficulty in implementing
policies not in keeping with the judgement of the General Staff.4 8
Within the General Staff, prerogatives in civilian matters led to
spheres of influence among the individual officers. The spheres of
influence encompassed specific functional areas, geographic regions
and/or government ministries. Certain positions on the General Staff
became critical in both military and political terms. Lieutenant
Colonel Noriega, for example, though not the most senior officer on
the General Staff, rose to be considered the second most influential
military figure in the Torrijos regime through his position as head of
G-2 Intelligence.49 Noriega controlled all national intelligence
functions and exercised influence over the issuance of the c~dula or
civilian identity document required of all legal resident of Panama
over the age of 18.
No less prevalent on the lower echelons of National Guard,
military prerogatives and political intervention were also exercised
48 Panamanian Politics, p. 45.
49 Ibid.
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by junior officers. The power relationship between the civilian
population and the National Guard reflected the power relationship in
chain of command that existedwithin the National Guard itself.
Stationed in each province was a military zone commander, usually a
major or captain. Under Torrijos, the commanders of the 10 military
zones were responsible only to Torrijos and as such functioned as de
facto provincial governors.5 0  The zone commanders regularly
influenced decisions at the regional level and senior civilian
government ministers were known to be overruled by these junior
officers. Successful zone commanders could expect subsequent
assignment to more important military zones closer to the capital or
to more influential positions on the General Staff.
The ability of the National Guard to play such a central political
role in Panamanian society after 1968 was a direct result of the
institutional growth, modernization and transformation of the
National Guard under Torrijos.5 1 Militarization in 1959 had resulted
in the formation of a special pubic order force in response to an
invasion of Panama by supporters of deposed President Arias'
supporters launched from Castro's Cuba. The public order force
became the prototype of the infantry rifle companies that comprised
the National Guard's military component. The location of these units
throughout Panama was not haphazard but well thought out, as these
units constituted the basis for Torrijos' domination of Panamanian
50 Panama: A Country Study, p. 228.
51 Panamanian Politics, p. 42.
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society. Most units were situated in and around the capital of Panama
City, while two companies were stationed at Rfo Hato in Cocl
Province. Torrijos' operational headquarters was also located at Rro
Hato, just two hours by automobile from Panama City. In event of a
unrest in the capital the two companies in Cocl6 served as a reserve
force sufficiently removed but within striking range of Panama
City.5 2 In addition, lines of authority ran directly from Torrijos to all
the rifle companies, with no input from the General Staff.
The military coup of October 1968 resulted as a common response
by National Guard officers to external tampering with their command
structure by President Arias. Once the outside interference had been
removed, the goals of the coup became unclear. The provisional
junta's initial manifesto reflected a lack of direction and appeared
desirous of a return to civilian rule. But with the consolidation of the
coup under Torrijos following an internal National Guard power
struggle, the long-standing National Guard aspiration for a more
influential role in civilian politics emerged.
Prior to the 1968 coup, the president of the republic was
Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard, as specified by the 1946
constitution. As such, the president possessed the right, if not
always the power, to remove and appoint National Guard personnel.
Under the provisions of the 1972 constitution, the president had no
such power. Article Two stated that government agencies were to act
in "harmonic collaboration with the National Guard." Under Torrijos
52 Ibid., p. 45.
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the military mission, capability and outlook of the National Guard had
been dramatically enhanced. After the 1968 coup military
involvement in civilian politics increased as well, as military
prerogatives and domination of Panamanian politics became firmly
entrenched. The central deliberative role of the Panamanian military
became firmly etched in the fabric of Panamanian society.
The relationship of the National Guard with Panamanian society
underwent dramatic changes under Torrijismo. Having divorced itself
from subservience to the Panamanian elite, the National Guard sought
to strengthen its national governing credentials with the
marginalized urban and rural groups of Panamanian society. Due to
the traditional lack of social prestige the National Police and the
National Guard had been forced to recruit from the urban ghettos and
rural areas of Panama.5 3 The resulting composition of the military
institution was predominantly of marginalized urban blacks or
campesinos. It is of note that the complement of the National Guard's
military rifle companies were recruited primarily from the rural
provinces, similar to where Torrijos had grown up. Through
recruitment of these rural troops, Torrijos ensured personal loyalty
from the rifle companies.
As a result of the early police structure of the National Guard the
lines between the enlisted ranks and officers was never clearly
defined. Although the officer corps of the National Guard and PDF
were increasingly strengthened by military academy graduates, there
53 Wesson, p. 6.
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were always a handful of officers who had risen from the ranks.5 4
The lack of social barriers based on differing racial, and class
backgrounds facilitated the ascendance of "police" officers into the
ranks of the "military" officers. Under Torrijos, officers were cross-
trained into the various units and missions of the National Guard,
professionally trained military academy graduates and officers from
the ranks were rotated between the military and increasingly
unpopular police units. The unity created by this common experience
within the institution also fostered a strong sense of institutional
identity and loyalty among the officers. The fairly similar economic
backgrounds of the majority of the personnel also contributed to the
strong sense of institutional loyalty and espirit de corps enhanced and
intertwined with Torrijismo. Under Torrijos this institutional espirit
de corps was carefully nurtured in order to maintain the perception of
the military institution's superiority and separation from the rest of
society.
The lower class backgrounds of many military officers and men
also assisted the National Guard's legitimization of their post-1968
dominance to the marginal sectors of Panamanian society. The
location of the National Guard and later PDF central headquarters in
the ghetto of Chorrillo had long given the military institution a
geographic identification with the urban masses. Under Torrijos, five
of twelve troop commanders were promoted from the ranks, of these
54 Ibid., p. 28.
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five three were born in the ghetto of Chorrillo in close proximity to
the National Guard headquarters.
A factor that contributed to Torrijos' populist reform orientation
was the reformist orientation of the 1968 General Juan Velasco
Alvarado military coup in Peru. Key members of the General Staff,
Manuel Noriega and Roberto Dfaz Herrera,Torrijos' cousin, had
graduated from the Peruvian Military Academy in the early 1960s.
This "Peruanista" influence resulted in establishment of a school
modelled on a Peruvian military academy designed to provide the
National Guard with trained personnel proficient in non-military
areas such as agronomy. Under direction of Peruanista Dfaz Herrera, a
National School for Political Capacitation (ESCANAP) was established
to bring military personnel, officer and enlisted, together with
civilians from various sectors in order to institutionalize reformist
political learning in both military and civilian sectors.55  ESCANAP
was one of Torrijismo's primary engines of diffusing Torrijismo
throughout various segments of society. ESCANAP served as a medium
for education and policy coordination between the marginalized
sectors of society, the ruling National Guard, and Torrijos. The
military's search for greater acceptance led to a roughly defined but
growing political role in national development, through Torrijismo.
As a result, the military institution developed new non-military
expertise and an increased scope of political prerogatives.
55 Ibid., p. 50.
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With the significant increase in political power came negative
aspects of National Guard behavior that hurt its public image. The
officer corps, especially the General Staff and military zone
commanders, regularly used their political influence and/or military
power in questionable business activities meant both to generate
personal wealth and increase welfare of the troops. Rem6n had
started the practice of using control of the "defenders of the public",
the police force, to accumulate "gift" stocks from major companies.5 6
The National Guard also profited from and eventually grew to control
prostitution, smuggling, and drug trafficking in Panama. The
combination of military and police functions eventually led to direct
control of immigration, customs, ports, airports and tax collection by
the PDF. This direct control over the revenue-generating
infrastructure resulted in rampant corruption on all levels of the
military, up to the commander.
Corruption in the military was an accepted way of doing business
and reinforcing ties of personal loyalty, but was not unique to the
military. Corruption was endemic in Panamanian society and
government. In many cases the corruption was instigated by civilian
attempting to purchase influence with National Guard officers.
Promotion to more powerful positions usually was accompanied by the
increased opportunity to line the pocket. As officers grew more
powerful, they concentrated on less obvious corruption, focusing
instead on activities such as money laundering, tacit tolerance of
56 Ibid., p. 46.
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drug activity and transshipment, as opposed to actual participation.
Strategically placed cronies or relatives in private firms or
legitimate government agencies oversaw operations diverting public
attention from the military. Believing in their existence as a
separate, privileged class exempt from the jurisdiction of civil
society, the National Guard embodied the exemptions and prerogatives
of the colonial fuero militar, in which crimes committed by the
military were rarely prosecuted by the judiciary.S7
C. NORIEGA YEARS AND DEPARTURE FROM TORRIJISMO
The July 1981 death of General Torrijos in a highly suspect plane
crash did not end continued military domination of politics but
signalled the beginning of a new era marked by wanton abuses,
excessive corruption and manipulation of the National Guard,
eventually leading to the military institution's downfall through
external intervention. After a brief leadership under Colonel
Florencio Florez, Torrijos' Chief of Staff, the new National Guard
commander and Torrijos prot~g6,5 8 General Ruben Darfo Paredes,
formulated plans to run for the presidency in 1984. Even though still
on active duty, Paredes publicly condemned the Torrijos-appointed
civilian President Aristides Royo for the economic deterioration and
57 Fitch, S., Lowenthal, A., Armies and Politics in Latin America, p. 205, Holmes
and Meier, Inc. 1986.
58A loyal Torrijista, Paredes had been groomed by Torrijos to succeed him since
1975.
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corruption in administering Panama's social security system.59 In the
midst of public unrest against Royo, Paredes intervened in July 1982,
and with the support of the National Guard, forced the resignation of
Royo and most of his cabinet. In his place was chosen Vice-President
Ricardo De La Espriella who immediately referred to the National
Guard as his "partner in power."60
In November 1982, a series of draft amendments to the 1972
Constitution were proposed. One provision banned participation in
elections by active duty military officers. Approved by national
referendum, this provision appeared to be a significant step in
lessening the power of the National Guard. In reality, the National
Guard was to retain its dominant position. In accordance with the
new constitutional provision, General Paredes retired from the
National Guard to run for president. In an alleged deal between
several senior members of the General Staff, Paredes was to be
supported in his presidential campaign by the National Guard, while
the position of National Guard commander was to be rotated between
the other senior officers. The first of those officers, Manuel Antonio
Noriega, succeeded Paredes, but then announced that neither he nor
the National Guard would support any candidate for president in the
1983 elections. The reality of Panamanian politics had not changed.
Without a popular base of support and the endorsement of the National
Guard and its commander, Paredes could not become president.
59 Panama:A Country Study, p. 60.
60 Ibid.
52
With Paredes removed from the political scene, the National Guard
under Noriega continued in its progression towards establishment of
the national army. One of Noriega's first acts was to have the
Assembly of Corregimientos restructure the military institution and
create the Panama Defense Force. The paramilitary National Guard
had matured into a military force, as the mechanics behind its
creation asserted the very real political power still exercised by the
military despite the recent constitutional amendments. Although the
president of the republic was the nominal head of the Panamanian
Defense Force, real power in Panama rested with Noriega, who
assumed the new title of commander of the Panamanian Defense
Force. 61
The establishment of the Panamanian Defense Force did not result
in any dramatic changes from the power and character of the National
Guard. If anything, establishment of the PDF legitimized the
previously adopted role of the National Guard in civilian politics and
national development in the eyes of the institution. Under Noriega,
the military institution was not ready to relinquish its unlimited
scope of power and unsubordinated role in society. Noriega was to
continually show the military institution's dominance in civilian
politics by installing and removing four Panamanian presidents.
During the 1984 presidential elections, the military-supported,
Partido Revolucionario Democrdtico (PRD) again faced three-time
Panamanian president Arnulfo Arias Madrid of the Alianza
61 Ibid., p. 61.
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Democrctica de Oposici6n(ADO).6 2 Arias emphasized the need to
reduce military influence in Panamanian politics, and especially
called for the removal of a 1983 defense bill that gave Noriega's PDF
control over all security forces and many government services.63 The
campaign was bitterly contested, but election day, May 6, was
peaceful. In order to ensure military prerogatives in Panamanian
politics, Noriega ordered military intervention in the vote counting
process. The Panamanian Defense Forces took custody of many vote
boxes 24 hours before the vote count. Further irregularities and errors
in voter registration and the vote count led to 2,124 credible charges
of electoral misconduct and fraud. On May 17, the members of the
National Board of Vote Examiners declared their inability to continue
the vote count due to massive fraud and turned over the process to the
government's Electoral Tribunal. Opposition charges that election
results had been destroyed before counting were dismissed by the
Electoral Tribunal. On May 16, 1984, the Electoral Tribunal announced
that the government backed PRD presidential candidate, Nicolds
Ardito Barletta, one of Torrijos' Liberal party t6cnicos, had won the
election. Through fraud Noriega had triumphed and circumvented the
Arias threat to military political power.6 4
By October 1985, President Barletta had been forced to resign by
Noriega. Panama's lack of its own national currency and traditional
62Panamanian Politics, p. 22.
63 Panama: A Country Study, p. 62.
64 1bid., p. 63.
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reliance on the American dollar led to government development
projects being financed mainly through international borrowing.
Attempting to deal with Panama's $3.6 billion debt to foreign
commercial banks and international lending institutions, President
Barletta independently engaged the international lending institutions
in closed-door discussions. In attempts to deal with this problem,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demanded that
Panama change its spending habits, but Barletta's contemplated
economic austerity measures were perceived by a significant
proportion of Panama's population as detrimental to their interests.
This disenchantment with Barletta's planned economic policies was
followed by Barletta's decision to investigate the alleged murder of
Noriega rival Dr. Hugo Spadafora by the PDF. The climax came when
Noriega replaced Barletta with his First Vice-President, Eric Arturo
Del Valle. 65
In February 1988, Del Valle announced the dismissal of General
Noriega as commander of the PDF in response to two indictments from
grand juries in Tampa and Miami. Noriega was accused of numerous
counts of racketeering, drug trafficking, money laundering, as well as
providing Panama as a haven and transshipment point to drug
traffickers for millions of dollars in bribes.66  However, the colonel
chosen to replace Noriega rejected his appointment and along with
65Ropp, S.,"General Noriega's Panama,"Current History, Volume 85, Number
515, p. 422, December 1986.
66EIaine, Sciolino, "Panama President Dismisses Noriega: Situation Unclear," New
York Times, 26 February 1988.
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others in the officer corps, pledged their loyalty to Noriega. In
response, Noriega convened the Assembly of Corregimientos which
voted to oust Del Valle and replaced him with the Education Minister,
Manuel Solis Palma. Solis Palma was to complete the remainder of
the term and relinquish power to the winner of the May 1989
presidential elections.
After elections held on 7 May 1989, both Carlos Duque, the
government backed PRD presidential candidate and Guillermo Endara
of the opposition Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition (ADOC)
coalition claimed victory. Five hours after the polls closed, Duque
claimed victory based on an "ample majority" in early returns. An
hour later, Endara also announced a landslide victory with returns
from 82 of Panama's 4,255 national polling stations. Endara's results
gave 78% of the vote to ADOC and 21% to Duque. 67 Witnessed by
international observers including Jimmy Carter, Senator John McCain,
and Congressman John Murtha, the vote had been considered relatively
fraud free, but the vote count was another story. On 8 May, the
Noriega backed government raided vote counting centers and delayed
the start of an official tally. 6 8  However, a statement by the
Panamanian Episcopal Conference comprised of Panama's 12 Roman
Catholic bishops said results of a "quick count" by its workers showed
a ADOC with 74.2% of the vote in contrast to 24.9% for the Noriega-
67Coone, Tim, and Barber, Lionel, "Both Sides Claim Victory in Panama," Financial
Times, 9 May 1989.
68Branigan, William, "General Noriega Forces Delay Vote Count," Washington
Post, 9 May 1989.
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backed Coalition of National Liberation (COLINA), supporting Endara's
victory claims. The Episcopal Conference results covered 27,723
voter of Panama's 1.18 million eligible voters, and 115 of the national
polling stations.
On 11 May, faced with an overwhelming and surprising opposition
victory, the government's Electoral Tribunal annulled the vote count
citing "obstruction by foreigners" and lack of official tally sheets as
justification. 69 . Head of the Electoral Tribunal announced that the
executive branch would be responsible for resolving the problem of
presidential succession once the term of Noriega appointee,
incumbent Manuel Solis Palma expired on 1 September. After the
failure of almost three months of tripartite negotiations, between the
ADOC, the government-backed PRD, and the PDF, mediated by the
Organization of American States to resolve the post election crisis,
Noriega installed the last military-backed president. On August 31,
1989 Francisco Rodriguez was announced as President of a new
provisional government. The National Comptroller since 1983,
Rodriguez had been a high school classmate of Noriega. In addition,
Noriega abolished the National Assembly and replaced it with a
National Legislative Commission, comprised of Noriega supporters.
Noriega's successive manipulation of politics and the presidency,
was a direct result of Torrijismo's involvement of the military in
politics. However, Noriega's abuse of the Torrijismo's legacy out of
69Gruson, Linsey, "Noriega Foes Say Vote Must Stand," New York Times, 12 May
1989.
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lust for personal power eventually drew opposition from within the
military institution. Many in the military believed the numerous
accusations against Noriega were bringing dishonor to their
institution. A departure from the military cohesiveness of Torrijismo
had begun. Noriega's alienation of even members of the military
contrasted sharply with Torrijismo's broad alliance that had
transcended the military and encompassed even factions of his
opponents.
D. INSTITUTIONAL DECAY
In the latter half of the 1980s, Panama had suffered a political
and economic crisis and experienced tension in its relationship with
the United States. As a result of the U.S. indictments of Noriega, the
United States had cut off all aid to Panama, and put into place
strangling economic sanctions. The United States engaged in an
action-intermittent, rhetorically-constant campaign to dislodge
Noriega as the ruler of Panama. But the first crack in the
institutional shell of the military institution, was revealed by the
forced retirement of Noriega's fellow Peruanista, and second in
command of the PDF, Colonel Diaz Herrera. Diaz Herrera as the
director of ESCANAP had been a strong proponent of Torrijismo, had
been a constant reminder to Noriega of the less excessive days of
Torrijismo. Diaz Herrera had consistently opposed Noriega's policies
as detrimental to the military institution and inconsistent with
Torrijismo. Forced to retire by Noriega, Diaz Herrera called a news
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conference to publicly denounce and accuse Noriega of complicity in
the deaths of Torrijos, Spadafora, and in the 1984 election fraud.
Dfaz's revelations were not significant in what they said about
Noriega but because he was the first high-ranking PDF officer to
break the traditional military code of silence about the institution's
activities. The traditional lack of societal scrutiny of the military
institution had ended, and the institutional decay had begun.
Diaz's confessions unleashed an unprecedented wave of public
protest against Noriega and the government. The opposition National
Civilianization Crusade composed of over 100 civic groups began to
pressure for the establishment of an authentic democracy. Anti-
government protestors began regular marches and demonstrations not
seen since the establishment of the military government in 1968.
Even the normally uninvolved Roman Catholic Church played a
surprisingly active role by sponsoring masses where demonstrators
and opposition members could gather with impunity. A growing sense
of anti-government militancy surfaced in Panama, three of six
morning newspapers failed to submit articles for governn,-
censorship,70 many businesses closed and Panama City was virtually
shut down as the protests turned violent.
Noriega responded by imposing a state of emergency on June 12,
1987 that was to last 19 days. Constitutionally-guaranteed civil and
political rights were suspended as the University of Panama and all
70Kinzer, Stephen, "Three Panama Papers Won't Publish Without Censorship,"
New York Times, 13 June 1987.
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high schools in Panama City were shut down to prevent students and
teachers from joining the anti-government protests.7 1  For the first
time, active if not somewhat clumsy repression of civilians occurred
as riot police from a PDF public order company, the mDobermans,"
using tear gas and buckshot were unleashed against the street
demonstrators. Though the Dobermans were unskillful in the
execution of their new tasks of repression, they soon improved. By
July, the level of repression increased, anti-government protestors
began to discover they had to confront not only riot police, but
uniformed soldiers and paramilitary goon squads of armed civilians.72
The heavy repression contrasted sharply with its absence under
Torrijos. The repression was effective, however, as anti-government
demonstrations began to recede as opposition leaders began to report
abusive treatment of demonstrators detained by the government. 7 3
The Panamanian military institution that had once been the
transmission belt of reform in Panamanian society under Torrijos was
now employing brutal repression of unarmed citizens. As the crisis
deepened, civilian challenge to the military's traditional political
dominance also resulted. Former presidents, Royo and Barletta, made
71 Kinzer, Stephen, "Panama Calls State of Emergency After Fourth Day of Violent
Protest," New York Times,12 June 1987.
72 Kinzer, Stephen, "Panama Boils," New York Times,15 July 1987.
73 Kinzer, Stephen, "Released Panamanians Tell of Abusive Treatment," New York
Times, 16 July 1987.
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public statements to the effect that they had been removed from
office by the military institution. 7 4
Most damaging because of their potential impact within the
military institution itself were Diaz Herrera's accusations, and
former commander, and Torrijista, General Paredes' pleas to his
comrades in arms to remove Noriega. Clearly Noriega was damaging
the cohesiveness of the institution. In March 1988, Panamanian Chief
of Police, Colonel Macias attempted a coup to remove Noriega from his
post. Macias' disloyalty was significant in that it was out of
professed loyalty to Noriega that he had refused Del Valle's offer of
Noriega's position just one month before. In response to Macias'
failed coup, Noriega restructured the military high command creating
the Strategic Military Council dominated by mid-level and junior
officers personally loyal to him. Initially meant to counterbalance any
potential disloyalty on the General Staff, the Strategic Military
Council diluted the authority of the General Staff as Noriega retired
senior members of the General Staff and replaced them with
relatively junior officers of the Strategic Military Council. 75  The
institutional instability within the military manifested by the
opposition to Noriega was a direct result of his clash with
Torrijismo, prominent among the officers whose loyalty he questioned
were senior Torrijista officers on the General Staff such as Diaz
74 Ropp, S., "Panama's Struggle for Democracy," Current History., Volume 86,
Number 524, p. 421, December 1987.
75Ropp, S., "Military Retrenchment and Decay in Panama,"Current History,
Volume 89, Number 543, p. 19, January 1990.
61
Herrera, and Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan. Noriega had
departed from the traditions of the institution that Torrijos had come
to symbolize.
Eventually Noriega was to ignore the General Staff in all
important issues and rely solely on his Strategic Military Council. In
addition to the creation of the Strategic Military Council, Noriega
took steps to ensure the officer corp was loyal to him by conducting
regular "loyalty" seminars for each officer rank group and promoting
those whose continued personal loyalty to him was especially
noteworthy. Ironically, it was this move to consolidate his position
that hastened the institutional decay of the PDF leading to the coup
attempt of October 1989. Some officers on the Strategic Military
Council had been promoted, others had not. Noriega's erratic
promotions and retirement of General Staff Officers had destroyed
the continuity of the officer corps and the network of personal lines
of protection, patronage, and support that senior members of the
General Staff had extended to junior officers. 76 Officers not under
the traditional "protection" and patronage of Noriega began to
perceive themselves as increasingly vulnerable as the bonds of the
institution were destroyed by Noriega.
The diminished authority of the General Staff had critically
damaged the compadrazcgo system of informal and highly
personalized protection, patronage, and support that senior members
of the General Staff had extended to junior officers. As the
76 1bid.
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traditional system was dismantled, officers not connected to Noriega
through the compadrazcgo system began to perceive themselves as
increasingly vulnerable. The failed October 1989 coup attempt
personified the crumbling of the institutional fabric of the
Panamanian Defense Force. Unlike the "police"-Ied March 1988 coup,
the October coup attempt was spearheaded by the combat trained, 4th
Rifle Company "Urraca," led by Major Moises Giroldi. Noriega's
response to this coup was swift and brutal as he ordered the summary
execution of an undetermined number of officers and men. The
breakdown of the compadrazcgo system had even affected Noriega, as
the godfather to Giroldi's children, he was Giroldi's "compadre." 77
The failure of the October coup increasingly portrayed the
crumbling of the institutional fabric of the PDF. Unlike the previous
"police"-led coup attempt, the October coup attempt involved one of
the PDF's combat trained military rifle companies whose ranks
Torrijos had filled with his campesino compatriots. In response to
the failed coup Noriega ordered the summary execution of an
undetermined number of officers and men. The Panamanian Defense
Force had turned on itself in order to guarantee its survival and very
existence. Many argue that the success of either coup attempt would
not have led to the establishment of civilian government or democracy
in Panama because the coup plotting officers had been more
interested in furthering their own careers than democracy or civilian
77
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godparent relationships in the compadrazcgo syslem.
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rule. In as much as one of the goals of the attempted coups was to
restore the institution to its former balance, a move to civilian rule
would not have been an impossibility. It would have been easier to
have dealt with a new regime instead of an entrenched and cornered
Noriega as the potential successors would not have been facing U.S.
indictments. With the removal of Noriega, U.S. pressure may still have
brought about the slow progress to civilian rule that Torrijos had
begun. Indeed the proclamation of the October coup plotters had
clearly stated that theirs was strictly a military movement with no
politics involved and that their sole aim was to return to the guiding
principles of General Torrijos. 78
The disintegration of PDF cohesiveness under Noriega was
hastened by the U.S. invasion in December 1989. Following the
shooting death of a an unarmed, off-duty U.S. Marine officer who
attempted to run through a checkpoint in front of the Commandancia,
along with brutal treatment of other U.S. military personnel and
dependents, on 20 December 1989, President Bush ordered U.S. troops
into combat in Panama. Pointing out that one week before, General
Noriega had declared the existence of a state of war between Panama
and the U.S., President Bush cited the U.S. military mission as to
protect U.S. lives and property, U.S. interests in connection with U.S.
responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, restoration of
democracy in Panama and the arrest of General Noriega stemming
781bid., p. 38.
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from U.S. indictments. 7 9  The quick U.S. victory resulted in the
installation of a civilian regime in Panama under the leadership of
ADOC's Guillermo Endara. In its first major act, the U.S. installed
civilian government was forced to create the Public Force in order to
fill the vacuum left by the defeat and destruction of the Panamanian
Defense Force.
79
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IV. THE PUBLIC FORCE AND THE LEGACY OF TORRIJISMO
A. DEMILITARIZATION
Drawing from the members of the Panamanian Defense Force to
create the Public Force produced a crisis of legitimacy as well as a
potential threat to the civilian government. The overwhelming
criticism and public distrust of the Public Force due to the retention
of PDF elements in personnel, as well as because the distinction
between the periods of Torrijismo and Noriega to the general
population are blurred. Memories of military repression and abuse of
power color the resentment voiced by those critical of the Public
Force. Critics also point out that the attitudes and aspirations of the
former military personnel are the same and even more dangerous as
the military institution has lost all the privileges and perquisites
formerly enjoyed during the 21 year reign of the National Guard and
PDF.
In attempts to dispel fears of the Public Force, the First Vice
President President Ricardo Arias Calderon ruled out the possibility
of a coup because "the new Panamanian Public Force was not created
against the military but with them, and this will prevent resentment,
frustrations, and possible coups d' etat."80 Arias Calderon, who at the
time also served as Government and Justice Minister with supreme
80ACAN-EFE release in Spanish reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Services, Latin America, p. 28, FBIS-LAT-90-044, 6 March 1990.
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command of the various units of the Public Force, stated that he had
complete trust in the Public Force, as: "The day I lose trust in a Public
Force chief, he will no longer be serving as such."8 1 In defense of the
government's retention of large numbers of the PDF membership,
Arias Calderon points out that over 18% of the officers from Noriega's
PDF have been discharged or retired from the Public Force. Of the five
colonels on active duty on 19 December 1989, not a single one is on
Public Force duty; only three of 17 lieutenant colonels remain; of 69
majors 43 are still serving; of 137 captains, 94 remain; and of 252
lieutenants, 202 remain. 82  Arias Calderon also points out that 49
officers remain under arrest pending the governments internal
evaluation of of their complicity in torture, corruption, or human
rights violations during Noriega's repression of the political
opposition.
The civilian government asserts that the Public Force will be
controlled by civilian control of the budget. Under military rule no
one really planned or controlled the budget, and the 1989 military
expenditures were placed at about $150 million. Arias Calderon
stated that in contrast, the Legislative Assembly now has the
responsibility of es-ciblishing both the manning and the budget of the
Public Force, and projected the new budget to be about $80 million. 83
81 Ibid.
8 2 Panama City Television Service in Spanish, reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Services, Latin America, p. 40, FBIS-LAT-90-054, 20 March 1990.
831bid.
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Arias Calderon also contrasted the new structure of the Public
Force with that of the PDF, as within 75 days of civilian government,
the Immigration and Naturalization Department and the Traffic and
Transportation Department, and prison system were no longer under
military authority. The DENI has been transformed into the Technical
Judicial Police with a different purview than its secret police
functions, and upon approval by the Legislative Assembly will be
under the authority of the national Attorney General. 84 The central
basis of PDF power, the military units, have been disbanded and are
being transformed into government entities responsible for providing
a specific public service.
Nevertheless, the critics, such as ADOC leader Alberto Conte,
point out, that it is not the structure but the attitude, loyalty, and
intentions of the Public Force that are in question. By admission of
the former second in command of the Public Force, Lieutenant Colonel
Valdonedo:
8 4 1bid., p. 39.
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The Public Force is currently going through a very difficult
time, the institution has just suffered the trauma of an
invasion. The... members have just experienced ... seeing their
officers flee.. .the imprisonment of their top commander, who
unfortunately commanded these troops for a very long
time.. .this very institution and its men are feeling open
rejection by some groups in our community... they are the
object of resentment that Panamanian society has
accumulated for a very long time.. .the members are
confused. These very men, however, joined the Public Force
responding to a call by the Panamanian government.. .they
trusted President Endara and this government's
leaders.. .they joined the Public Force to contribute to our
country's reconstruction. Current members...experienced the
same trauma that the Panamanian people experienced
during the dictatorship.. .they experienced the trauma from a
different perspective but they and their families did
experience that trauma.. .they were confined to their
barracks.. .they did not see their wives and families for long
periods of time.. .these men were victims of false and
distorted propaganda.. .they were the victims of lies and bad
superiors.. .thus they are having a very difficult time.
However, they have the ability to overcome this for a
number of reasons.. .the traumatic experience of the
dictatorship makes them reject any possibilities of
returning to the past...they want to contribute to this
country's reconstruction... sometimes the community's
rejection and resentment fill them with insecurity.. .this
attitude makes them feel uneasy and prevents them from
acting up to ... society's expectations. Over the past six
years, Noriega approached training.., from a military point of
view. Today we have men eager to become good and
professional policemen, but they necessarily have to go
through a transition and training period to offer the service
the Panamanian society deserves. 85
85 1bid., p. 40.
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The foundations for the reservations, criticisms, and fears of
those opposed to the Public Force as well as the origins of the
difficulties currently faced by the Public Force are rooted in the
legacy of Torrijismo and military dominance, not only in civilian
politics, but indeed in all aspects of Panamanian life. The early
aspirations for a national army, and participation in national politics
fueled the evolution of the Panamanian military institution and led to
the establishment of a powerful military institution that dominated
Panama for decades. The extent of military prerogatives ranged from
manipulation of the presidency and the constitution, abuse and
corruption of government institutions, and brutal repression. The
seemingly interminable duration of military rule ingrained its
acceptance, however grudgingly, within the consciousness of the
Panamanian people. This same reality fostered the institutional belief
in military superiority, uniqueness, separation, and privilege, within
the military institution created the institutional identity that
allowed even the employment of the extremist measures to maintain
the institutional prerogative and dominance in civilian politics.
The many years of military rule established a well founded
insecurity and distrust of the military institution. Current conditions
exacerbate the distrust as the institution referred to by Lieutenant
Colonel Valdonedo is still in a state of "withdrawal" from the loss of
its many privileges, and control of the political scenery. Valdonedo's
references to the institution's suffering the trauma of invasion,
seeing its officers flee, uneasy attitude and traumatic experience
with dictatorship point to an institutional identity that is currently
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"in pain." This pain is a result of the imprisonment and killing of
fellow officers and men during the previous coup attempts, from the
deaths and wounded sustained during the invasion, and the military
institution's loss of the premier position in Panamanian society.
The Noriega influence, in contrast, is rejected as responsible for
the institutional decay and the low point that the institution
currently finds itself. Noriega's personal manipulation of the PDF's
chain of command and traditions, are faulted for the instability in the
institution, while his intransigence against U.S. pressure are blamed
for the invasion and the diminished Public Force role in society. The
current uncertainty, pain, and identity crisis within the Public Force
will eventually heal as the institutional cohesiveness and identity is
established. Herein lies the major obstacle to the Public Force's
transition to an apolitical, subordinate, police force. Since
Torrijismo was responsible for installing the military institution at
the apex of Panamanian society, it will again be favorably viewed as
the basis of a renewed Public Force identity, and new role in society.
Torrijismo is remembered for creating the greatest period of
institutional cohesion, legitimacy and prestige, which resulted in the
durability of the dominance of the military institution. As this
strength-infusing institutional identity grows, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, the Public Force will be characterized by the military
traditions, and concepts of Torrijismo. In light of the traditional
disdain for police work, the Torrijista aspiration for a national army
will surface again. Also dissatisfaction with the civilian
government's political and economic problems will rekindle the desire
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for more participation in national decision-making that could be
supported by a growing segment of the population. Continuance of
social inequality and reversal of social progress under Torrijos will
also revive military determination to play a greater role in the
political process as the guardian of social progress.
In time, an armed institution will arise in Panama with
aspirations beyond the simple police duties envisioned by the civilian
government. Whether the character of this institution will follow the
traditions of the National Guard and the PDF remains to be seen, but
the probability is high that it will. In a country of weak civilian
institutions, the reestablished cohesiveness of the Public Force under
Torrijismo will make the transition to an apolitical police force
difficult. Panama's political culture does not bode well for the near
term strengthening of civilian institutions such as political parties
and government ministries, even under civilian rule. Patronage in
politics is still predominant and control of civilian institutions is
more a vehicle for political patronage and favors than public service.
Despite the existence of nominal democratic institutions and
processes, Panamanians have often opted for strong, personal,
charismatic, leadership and patronage politics rather than strong
civilian government institutions and cohesive, party politics.
B. PUBLIC FORCE WEAKNESS
In a the current period of material and institutional weakness, the
traditionally strong and most organized institution in Panama, the
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Public Force, is attempting to professionalize. The weakness makes
the establishment of institutional identity even more important.
Inevitably, the professionalized and strengthened institution may be
required to once again play a crucial role in deciding the political
future of Panama. The current weakness of the Public Force is only
temporary, resulting from tight government control. Reinstitution of
the Public Force's institutional identity will allow it to once again
become a strong player as part of the system of political patronage
that characterizes Panamanian politics.
Since the announcement of its ad hoc creation by the Endara
government on December 23, 198986 all aspects of the Public Force
have been marred by problems and setbacks. Formation of the Public
Force with a core of former members of the military has led to public
fears that a reconstitution of the Panamanian Defense Forces is
taking place. Public mistrust has exacerbated this problem of
credibility for the Public Force as a legitimate government
institution. The continuous changes in leadership within and the
undefined nature and character of the Public Force, has resulted in
widespread misunderstanding of the Panamanian Public Force.
The civilian government has defended the creation and existence
of the Public Force and attempted to explain the rationale behind the
Public Force, while simultaneously trying to keep it weak. In
response to opposition to the retention of former PDF members, the
8 6 1bid.
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government points to its legal basis under the constitution.
According to Arias Calderon: 8 7
The Public Force is being organized under constitutional laws
that allow the president of the Republic--with participation of
the pertinent minister--to appoint the chiefs and officers of the
Public Force according to the promotion roster and to stipulate
the use of the Public Force.8 8
The civilian government position is that in addition to providing for
public security, manning of the Public Force by ex-PDF members is a
positive step towards national demilitarization. The government
points out that many former PDF members suffered under the
dictatorship, enduring persecution, imprisonment, exile, and even
torture and death. Having suffered, they will have as much stake in
preventing a repetition of the abuses of past as the civilian populace.
In retaining the majority of the Panamanian Defense Force the
government has made positive steps toward national reconstruction
and reconciliation. To have excluded all members of the Panamanian
Defense Force would have judged them categorically, not as
individuals which is their right as Panamanians.
8 7At the time Second Vice President Ricardo Arias Calderon also occupied the
Cabinet post of Government and Justice Minister. In this position Arias Calderon
functioned as the senior civilian head of the Public Force. Due to the removal of the
Christian Democrats from the ruling coalition, Arias Calderon no longer serves in this
dual capacity.
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"Arias Speaks on Creation of Public Force,"Panama City Domestic Service
coverage of a live speech in Spanish, 18 January 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Latin America, p. 38, FBIS LAT-90-015, 23 January 1990.
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Creation of the Public Force, was a step at strengthening civilian
rule through their inclusion. 8 9  However, government rhetoric in
support of the Public Force has not prevented it from interfering in
the institution to maintain strong control over it. Through
demilitarization and restructuring of its organization, the Public
Force has been kept weak. The effectiveness of strict budgetary
controls, stifling of any outspokenness from public force leaders, and
denial of access to former sources of patronage, contrasts the Public
Force with PDF of the past.
Arias Calderon outlined the Public Force mission as protection of
the lives, honor, and property of all Panamanians, maintenance of
public order, prevention of crime while respecting human rights,
enforcement of traffic regulations, vigilance against possible urban
guerrilla warfare from the Dignity Battalions, prevention of drug
violence, and prevention of external subversion of the Panamanian
government.9 0 In a temporary measure to regulate the Public Force
until the National Assembly can draft more permanent legislation, the
Panamanian cabinet on 10 February 1990 adopted Cabinet Decree 38.
In the interest of demilitarization it states:
891bid.
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"Arias Calderon Interviewed on Public Force" radio interview in Spanish on
Panama City Cadena Exitosa, 12 February 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service,Latin America, p. 18, FBIS LAT-90-031, 14 February 1990.
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Article 1: The Public Force of the Republic of Panama is
organized with the technical and professional responsibility
for public security and national defense.. .the Public Force
answers directly to the executive of the Republic with full
respect for human rights as a safeguard and support of
democratic institutions.
Article 2: The president of the Republic is the supreme chief
of the Public Force, he will rule over the Public Force
through decrees, rules, orders. 91
The decree leaves no doubt as to the civilian authority with regard to
the Public Force.
Under Decree 38, the Public Force consists of the National Police,
the National Air Service, and the National Maritime Service, each with
its own command, salary, and rank scale under the authority of the
executive branch through the Minister of Government and Justice.
This new structure results in three distinct public service agencies
instead of a single public security organ reflecting the
decentralization within the Public Force. 92  The National Department
of Investigations (DENI), formerly attached to the Panamanian Defense
Force Intelligence Directorate, or G-2, in accordance with Cabinet
Decree 38, has been redesignated the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ),
temporarily under the Government and Justice Ministry. Independent
from the Public Force the Judicial Technical Police will eventually be
91 Ibid., p. 19. The article also goes on to state that with the participation of the
pertinent minister, the president will appoint and remove the leaders, officers and
members of the Public Force; grant promotions and give instruction on the use of the
Public Force as the Constitution provides.
9 2 1bid., p. 19.
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assigned to the office of the national Attorney General. 9 3 Yet the
Public Force is not entirely limited to nonmilitary mission as Article
Seven of Decree 38 allows for some paramilitary units:
With the approval of the countrys president and government
and justice minister (sic), special National Police Units can be
organized to guard the the borders and protect our national
integrity; to protect the Panama Canal according to the 1977
canal treaties and in accordance with Foreign Ministry
instructions.. .these units will be separated from the National
Police if the law so stipulates. The country has certain security
needs that cannot be met by a regular police force.9 4
With two exceptions, all military combatant units have been dissolved
and integrated into the Public Force, comprising the bulk of the police
service. Noriega's prized infantry rifle companies, the end product of
years of militarization of the National Guard, and the core of the
Panamanian Defense Force institutional identity have been
dismantled. 95  Officially disbanded were the 1st Rifle Company in
Tinajitas; the 2nd Rifle Company, "Pumas" in Tocumen, site of the
international airport; the 4th Company, "Urraca", responsible for
Commandancia 96 security prior to their participation in the 3 October
1989 coup attenpt; the 5th Rifle Company, "Los Cholos" of Fort
Amador; the 6th Rifle Company, Mechanized in Rio Hato; the 7th Rifle
9 3 1bid., p. 20.
9 4 1bid.
9 5 1bid., p. 40.
9 6The main headquarters of the Panamanian Defense Force was commonly referred
to as the "commandancia."
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Company, "Macho de Monte" of Rio Hato; and the 8th Rifle Company,
Colon. Only two old units remain, the Paz (Peace) Battalion and the
3rd Rifle Company, "Diablos Rojos," both assigned to patrolling the
Costa Rican border in Chiriqui province. 97
The typically military functions of what used to be the
Panamanian Air Force and National Navy have been eliminated by the
dictates of Decree 38. As hinted to by the names of the new services,
the National Police is responsible for the protection of lives, honor,
and property, maintenance of public order security and crime
prevention, and regulation of traffic on public highways according to
the law and traffic regulations. The National Air Service is
responsible for air transportation and support of government
agencies, support of government socioeconomic development
programs, National Police functions, and search and rescue operations.
Similarly, the National Maritime Service is tasked with seaborne
government transportation and support, while also acting as a
maritime police. As there exists a legitimate need for coast guard
services, the maritime police duties are particularly aimed at
preventing piracy, illegal fishing, contraband, and illegal immigration.
The National Maritime Service is formally tasked with support of the
General Customs Directorate and the Immigration and Naturalization
Directorate.
9 7 1bid. Although referred to simply as infantry companies by Arias Calderon,
author has added additional information to further identify unit, mission, and any
noteworthy details.
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Noncombatant military service units with application in public
service such as the military health battalion and the military
engineers battalion have been dissolved. Medical personnel who
provide services to and with the Public Force will be civilian
personnel assigned to the government Health Ministry or to the Social
Security Fund. Military engineering equipment has been divided up
between the Government and Justice Ministry and the Public Works
Ministry. 98  Even the Catholic Church has eliminated all military
chaplain positions and will allow for spiritual services to members of
the Public Force through priests without military rank.
Former agencies known for rampant corruption under military
control,the Immigration and Naturalization Department, along with a
newly created Passport Office, and the National Directorate of Land
Traffic Management and Transportation (DNTT) are under the Ministry
of Government and Justice.99  Mismanaged and tolerant of human
rights violations under Noriega, the Penitentiary System, charged
with monitoring of penitentiaries and jails, is also under direct
civilian supervision of the Government and Justice Ministry's
Rehabilitation Directorate.' 0 0
Emphasis on the technical responsibilities of the Public Force in
the area of public security are aimed at ruling out any deliberative
98 1bid., p. 39.
9 9 1bid.
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political function for the Public Force. Article 15, the pertinent
article of the Cabinet decree states that:
The Public Force is not deliberative--precisely because it is a
technical and professional organization--and its members will
under no circumstance intervene in party politics, except for
casting their votes.
The leaders and officers of the Public Force will not exercise
coercion of any kind over members of the force when they cast
their votes in elections. They may not participate in public
posts, directorates, or boards of directors outside of the branch
of the Public Force to which they belong except as provided in
international treaties and future laws.10 1
In keeping with the article, active duty Public Force members are
barred from any political activity of any kind including formal
involvement in party politics or even making partisan political
statements. This article is especially indicative of the civilian
government's paranoia of the Public Force.
The decree also defines the context of Public Force relations with
civilian authorities from the provincial level down to the municipal
and corregimiento levels. Article 8 decrees:
The National Police will act in consultation and coordination
with civilian authorities at the provincial, municipal, and
corregimiento levels and, as an agent of those authorities, it will
obey the orders dictated by the authorities in the exercise their
legal functions.102
101
"Arias Calderon Interviewed on Public Force," p. 21.
1021bid.
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This decreed civilian subordination of the Public Force contrasts
strongly with previous days when Panamanian Defense Force officers
assigned as military zone commanders in the provinces exercised
authority and prerogatives as de facto provincial governors, often
vetoing more senior civilian government ministers.10 3 Article 8 also
provides for the autonomy and protection of the internal structure of
the Public Force with regard to civilian authorities external to the
Public Force chain of command. Civilian authority at the various
levels of government are strictly prohibited from interfering with the
internal structure Public Force as an institution, especially in the
area of internal discipline.
In discussing this, Arias Calderon states that:
the authority of the governor, mayor, and corregimiento
representative is not part of the internal discipline of the
institution, ... we are not stating that local authorities should
become a part of the National Police's internal organization.. .we
are saying that when local representatives exercise their
authority and require the National Police's support to carry out
...orders, the National Police has to obey those orders.' 0 4
In relation to civilian apprehension over military resurgence in the
Public Force, the government contrasts Panama's Public Force with
other Latin American countries formerly under military dictatorship
and now attempting transitions to democracy. Arias Calderon makes
two cnmpelling points by observing that first, all democratizing
103
"Panamanian Politics," p. 45.
104
"Arias Calderon Interviewed on Public Force," p. 22.
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former Latin American dictatorships of the last two decades --Peru,
Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala, and
El Salvador, have left their armed forces intact. Except for changes
on the very highest levels, the same military institutions that put
into power and supported military dictatorships were left in place as
government institutions supportive of democracy. Because of
Panama's failure to make a transition to civilian rule on its own, it
has gone much further than the other civilian governments and is
attempting demilitarization. Not only has it reorganized the former
military institution, but it has submitted the entire membership of
the Panamanian Defense Force to intensive background investigations
for any wrongdoing during the dictatorship.' 0 5 Hundreds of former
PDF members have been barred from the Public Force while serving
members of the Public Force have been expelled or retired from
service upon discovery of incriminating evidence. Second, the
nightmare of dictatorship was also suffered by the members of the
Panamanian Defense Forces that now make up the Public Force. Not
only did they witness the deterioration and manipulation of an
institution according to the personal dictates of one man and his
cronies, they took part in armed, intra-PDF combat which led to
executions and deaths of members. Furthermore, they lived through
the military destruction of their institution and are now feeling the
rejection of the people and nation they are sworn to serve.
10 51bid.
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Materially, as a public security force, the Public Force is barely a
remnant of its former self, lacking even the rudimentary equipment to
police the streets effectively. Communications equipment such as
portable radios for street cops and mobile patrols are in short supply,
preventing timely dispatching of policemen to crime scenes, or
contact with headquarters. Mobile patrols are hindered by a scarcity
of patrol cars, and adequate weaponry to fight crime. The outgunned
policemen are reluctant to engage armed criminals as they are
restricted by the government to patrol only with small caliber
weapons, such as .38 caliber revolvers, while criminals often possess
more powerful high-caliber weapons such as AK-47's and grenades
leftover from the military regime. In a section of downtown Panama
City containing some of the capital's worst slums, there are only 775
policemen and seven dilapidated vehicles to patrol seven precincts
containing 210,000 residents and daily workers.' 0 6 In the past police
concentration in Panama City was well over 1000, and this number
was reinforced by a reserve force of paramilitary riot police known
as the First Public Order Company, or the Dobermans. 10 7
Due to the high crime rate, involving high-caliber automatic
weapons, that has continued since the invasion, Alberto Conte, an
ADOC leader and publicist, has criticized the government restrictions
stating that the government sensitivity to criticism regarding
excessive force or abuse of human rights by the Public Force is
106
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actually encouraging crime. In a scene reminiscent of Noriega's
infamous public order companies, riot police have already fired tear
gas and bird shot at rock-throwing student protestors. Other civilian
leaders, such as Roberto Eisenmann, editor and owner of the newpaper
La Prensa, support the restrictions, contending that the Public Force
is using the crime wave as justification for more firepower and
militarization.' 08
Prominent members of Panama's business community have even
called for reinstatement of PDF officers. According to Edgardo Lasso,
president of the Panamanian Banking Association, the Public Force is
just not capable of containing Panama's mounting crime:
It is time we lost our fear, if the personnel of the Public Forces
are not capable,...it is necessary for the government to find
people who do know how to do this job.109
Though not explicitly mentioning the PDF, the implications were
clearly understood. A phone-in organized by Cadena Exitosa, a radio
station, confirmed this feeling as many who called in stated that the
"old defense forces" should be reassembled. 110
In a realistic assessment when still Public Force commander,
Colonel Eduardo Herrera, acknowledged the problem and quietly
lamented the civilian government's material control of the Public
108Laura Brooks,"Crime Wave Corruption Tie Up Panama's Police Force," The
Christian Science Monitor, p. 4, 28 August 1990.
109Time to Recall Noriega Officers?" Latin American Weekly Report, p. 11, WR
91-07, 21 February 1991.
1 101bid.
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Force. Characterizing lack of equipment as the Public Force's main
problem, "...most of the patrol cars, equipment, and facilities to lodge
personnel were destroyed.. .we are rebuilding some of these facilities
which were the target of looting, and we are replacing the vehicles,
some of which were destroyed by military action, ...concerning the
weapons that were turned over to U.S. military personnel, we are
gradually obtaining through the Government and Justice Ministry,
what is necessary for the police service."1 11
While the primary duty and force structure of the Public force is
police-oriented, problems of understaffed police precincts,
inadequate funding, equipment and firepower hinder the Public Force's
efforts at controlling crime. 1 12  In addition, according to Colonel
Eduardo Herrerra, any Public Force use of firearms in the line of duty
often resulted in dismissal or arrest of the Public Force member.
This situation has demoralized the Public Force members who feel the
struggle against criminal elements is waged unequally.113
Reflective of civilian control of the Public Forces is civilian
oversight of Public Force purchases of equipment, personnel strength,
and operations. Article 11 of Decree 38 limits the total number of
Public Force members to a percentage of the population (to be
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determined later by the legislative assembly). In case of war or
serious public disorder, the provision allows the executive branch to
decree a temporary increase in the numbers of members. Article 12
assigns the Comptroller General's Office with controlling and
supervising the budgeted funds for the various Public Force
services.1 14
Additionally, an inter-ministerial committee composed of
members from the Ministries of Finance and Treasury and the
Presidency, headed by the Government and Justice Ministry, has been
established to determine the disposition of the properties of the
former military. Under the dictatorship the military and their
civilian cronies had control of virtually all major sources of wealth
in Panama, illegal and legal. The Panamanian Defense Force was able
to transform government institutions into sources of personal
enrichment. The most compelling example was control of the Planning
and Economic Policy Ministry. As an appendix of the military, the
military exercised total control of the national budget and
expenditure. According to Comptroller General Ruben Dario Caries:
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The military went to the extreme of transferring $5 million
balboas from the government's bank account at the National bank
to the barracks every month by pressing a few buttons on their
computers. Not even the Comptroller General's Office or the
Treasury and Finance Ministry knew about that movement of
funds.15
The controversial Public Force retention of former Panamanian
Defense Force members was legalized by Cabinet Decree 38. Article
13 allowed that:
Seniority and retirement benefits earned by former members of
the extinct Defense Forces are recognized in favor of those who
join the various services of the Public Force. Public Force
members affected by the termination of service will have a right
to retire after completing 25 year of active service.. 116
The civilian government points out, however, that highest echelons of
the former military have been barred from the Public Force. 117  Arias
1 15
"Comptroller General Views Military Corruption," on Circuito RPC Television
in Spanish 31 January 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin
America, p. 26, FBIS LAT 90-025, 6 February 1990.
1 16 1bid., p. 46. Author believes this is to be the only formal written reference to
the consolidation of former PDF members in to the Public Force. Presumably personnel
who were never in the PDF are also allowed into the Public Force, but in an interview
with Critica Libre on 24 January 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Latin America, FBIS LAT 90-019, then commander Colonel Herrera Hassan
stated,"... for the time being, we are not accepting applicants who are not former member
of the Defense Forces because we would have to train them. We are only taking down
information on secondary school graduates who are interested in enrolling in the new
Police Academy."
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Calderon points this out as proof that the selection of former military
members for the Public Force has not been careless.
Civilian subordination and control of the Public Force is also
clearly evident in other areas. Of the three lieutenant colonels
considered sufficiently untainted by corruption, human rights abuse,
and free of political prerogatives during their former military
service, none remain on duty only months after the establishment of
the Public Force. Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Armijo, formerly on the
General Staff as head of the National Navy and first Public Force
colonel and commander was in office for only two weeks. The Endara
government's ongoing investigation of the activities of the former
military uncovered discrepancies in Colonel Armijo's personal
finances, forcing his replacement by the government.1 18 Succeeding
Armijo as Public Force commander was Colonel Eduardo Herrera,
former Panamanian Ambassador to Israel under Noriega until he was
forced to resign his post out of disagreement with the former
dictator. 1 19  Herrera returned from self exile in Miami to serve with
the Public Force. Credited with his years of military service, Herrera
retired ostensibly due to reaching mandatory retirement criteria, but
the retirement was amid controversy concerning his alleged
dissatisfaction with commanding a thoroughly demilitarized and weak
Public Force.
1 1 8 1bid., p. 39.
11 9 1n reality, Herrera Hassan was in "golden exile" or a relatively comfortable
exile away from the PDF due to opposition to Noriega's policies.
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In May 1990, accused of committing crimes against freedom of the
press, Lieutenant Colonel Aristrides Valdonedo, the deputy commander
of the Public Force, was removed by President Endara and Government
and Justice Minister Arias Calderon. According to the Attorney
General which issued a warrant for Valdonedo's arrest, under Noriega
Valdonedo took part in closing of newspapers and radio stations, and
in burning down a store owned by opposition members, as well as
torture during a stint as G-2 chief of staff. 120
In September Herrera's successor as Public Force commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Quezada was fired after writing a letter
to a newspaper defending himself against allegations of corrurtion.
The Endara government interpreted the letter as setting a dangerous
precedent for military outspokenness not to be tolerated while
civilian control of the Public Force was still being consolidated.
Quezada was replaced provisionally by Ebrahim Asvat, the first
civilian in 40 years to head the Panama's security forces. The
implications of these civilian dismissals of the Public Force
commanders is especially significant and indicative of the civilian
government's real authority and control over the Public Force. In
contrast with President Arturo Delvalle's failed attempt to fire
General Noriega from his post as Panamarian Defense Force
commander in 1988, the civilian authorities appeared to have
established their control over the Public Force.
12 0
"FLrther On Police Official's Dismissal," published in La Prensa in Spanish,
16 May 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, p. 15,
FBIS LAT 90-097, 18 May 1990.
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However, a December 1990 mutiny by about 100 members of the
Public Force, led by prison fugitive, Colonel Hassan, pointed to the
very questionable control of the Public Force by the civilian
authorities. After, a daring helicopter breakout of the imprisoned
Colonel Hassan, the mutineers succeeded in taking over the National
Police headquarters. Lack of intervention by the remaining units of
the Public Force resulted in the deployment of 500 U.S. troops at the
request of the Endara government. The U.S. troops succeeded in
retaking the headquarters as the mutineers surrendered. While their
stated demand was to bring attention to specific problems in the
Public Force, except for U.S. intervention, the Endara government
might have fallen. The attempted mutiny was a clear indication of
dissatisfaction within the Public Force with their current status.
With renewed institutional identity and vigor, the next mutiny may
not be as easily put down, if the entire Public Force participates.
Despite the Public Force complement of former military personnel,
the existing realities of equipment shortages, budget reduction,
demilitarizing reorganization, civilian domination, absence of any
strong leadership and breakdown of the institutional identity has
resulted in a severely weakened Public Force, thought to be unable to
mount any direct threat against the civilian government in the near
future. The December 1990 mutiny has disproved this. But Public
Force priority remains rebuilding the institution consistent with
Torrijismo instead of a power-taking coup. Indicative of Torrijismo
in the mutiny was that the mutineers went to the trouble of freeing
Herrera, a traditional Torrijista, from prison. Had the attempt been
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simply a military attempt to return to power, another officer could
have been chosen lead the attempt. In addition, neither were any ex-
PDF Noriega loyalists, who would have gladly participated, included in
the mutiny. More significant was the civilian response which was
not one of opposition to the mutiny, but rather of condemnation for
the U.S. intervention and uproar at the death of one of the mutineers
at the hands of the U.S. troops. Consistent with Torrijismo's
opposition to U.S. intervention in Panamanian affairs, the response to
the latest intervention was marked change from the welcome given
the invasion just one year earlier.
Relative gains and losses also strongly influence Public Force
motives, the current inheritance of severe economic disarray and a
national reconstruction burden currently from the civilian government
serve as major disincentives for any potential coup plotters.
Damages in the billions of dollars remain from U. S. trade sanctions
before the invasion, fighting during the invasion, and looting in its
aftermath. With a population of just over two million , the estimates
are that more than one million people are living in poverty, while
500,000 are unemployed. 12 1 As economic conditions worsen, anti-
government demonstrations by students and radical political groups
will probably be joined by ordinary Panamanians. Demonstrations
have been suppressed at government orders by Public Force using tear
gas, and tactics reminiscent of the old Panamanian Defense Force
12 1Catto, William, "Poverty Puts Panamanians' Patience to Test," Times of the
Americas, p. 1, Volume XXXIV, Number 17, 5 September 1985.
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Prior to the 1968 coup, Panamanian politics was with few
exceptions the domain of the oligarchy. Torrijos permitted a limited
form of civilian party politics in order to legitimize military rule
through creation of opportunities for popular civilian political
participation. While overall power remained with Torrijos, the new
politics succeeded in widening political participation.
Torrijos' social and political reforms towards the traditionally
excluded elements of Panamanian society resulted in increased
representation for the rural constituencies at the expense of the
urban commercial oligarchic elite. For the first time in Panamanian
history, black and mulatto leaders were incorporated into the national
government. 122  Even middle class opposition parties used the limited
opening in politics to the advantage of their parties. The Liberal
party was coopted to participate in politics under the military
government rule, while the Panamanian Christian Democratic Party
(PDC) used their new political status quo to broaden their party's base
beyond the confines of the urban academic and professional
community. 12 3  Lower middle class support for Torrijismo was
gained, in some cases weaned, from other political parties through
provision of jobs and other special perks. Social security benefits as
122Panamanian Politics, p.78.
123 1bid., p. 85.
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well as newly constructed large numbers of public housing units were
provided for these workers. 12 4
Similarly under the Endara government, the traditional patronage
rules govern the civilian bureaucracy as well as civilian politics.
Conspicuously absent is the overall political power wielded by the
military under Torrijismo. Without a dominant force in Panama today,
civilian politics is entering a new phase of Panamanian history.
Freedom from the military rule has resulted in a level of civilian
politics unrestrained as never before seen in Panama. The weakness
of Endara's presidency was evidenced by its failure to significantly
stimulate economic reinvigoration and reconstruction, or begin
political reconciliation vital to the post-invasion recovery. Endara's
weakness has fueled the politicking in Panama that resulted in
breakup of the ruling coalition in April 1991.
While it is unrealistic to expect changes overnight, Endara has not
attempted to increase his base of support among the lower classes.
The benefits of his regime are perceived to be going to a minority of
rabiblancos at the expense of the majority rabiprietos. Only two
cabinet posts were offered to leaders outside the rabiblanco class and
Endara has attacked Torrijos' reformist rule with the same force he
has criticized Noriega's more venal rule.
Consistent with Panamanian tradition, nepotism and patronage
have been the rule in filling government posts since the invasion. It
is the apparent misappropriation of patronage within the ruling
12 4 Panamanian Politics, p. 96.
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coalition that prevented the cohesion of the civilian government.
Political divisions along traditional party lines prevailed over loyalty
to the civilian government. III will between Endara's Partido
Arnulfista (PA) and Arias Calderon's Christian Democrats over the
allocation of government posts has existed since the installment of
the coalition. With the largest representation in National Assembly
based on the annulled 1989 election results, the PDC took the largest
number (5 of 12) of cabinet seats. 125  Endara's Arnulfistas have
complained that the PDC dominance has been at their expense. The
PDC on the other hand holds Endara's leadership to blame for the
coalition's dramatic drop in popularity. Voter opinion polls taken in
March 1991 show Endara's popularity with the voters at 17% compared
to 89% in the 1989 elections. 126
The fragile anti-Noriega coalition which initially selected Endara
as its presidential candidate because he offended the fewest number
of people, rapidly disintegrated, having lost its raison d'etre. 1 27
Support for Endara in the May 1989 elections was more an indictment
of Noriega than political support for Endara. 12 8  Any legitimacy
125
"Panama's Coalition Close to the Brink," Latin American Weekly Report,, p. 6,
18 April 1991, WR 91-14. Of the balance of the 12 seats, Partido Arnulfista has one,
the rest went to the Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA) and the
Partido Liberal Autentico, PLA.
1261bid. Popularity was measured by asking whether respondents would again vote
for Endara if elections were held that day.
127"Endara: The Wrong Man," A Council on Hemispheric Affairs Statement, 30
August, 1990 published in The Times of the Americas, p. 6, 5 September 1990.
1281bid.
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possessed by Endara was compromised by his installation into the
presidency on a U. S. military base on the eve of the invasion and the
calling in of U.S troops to quell the December 1990 mutiny. The
unrestrained political maneuvering within even his government
coalition, point to rough times ahead for an already tenuous civilian
government.
Partial legislative elections held in January 1991 gave the ruling
coalition a serious setback. The elections were to select officials for
positions left vacant due to inconclusive results during the 1989
elections. Most significant were the nine seats vacant in the National
Assembly. The results of the elections gave five seats to the
opposition formerly aligned with the military and Torrijismo. Of the
five seats, the PRD took three, the Partido Liberal took two, and the
Partido Laborista (PALA) took one. The government coalition's PDC
won two seats, along with two for the Movimiento Liberal Republicano
Nacionalista (MOLIRENA). Endara's party did not win any. Both the
PDC and MOLIRENA took the opportunity to lash out at the Endara
government. First Vice President Arias Calderon of the PDC called the
shift to the opposition a "warning," while Second Vice President of
MOLIRENA called it "a loud and clear" indication "...that the population
is dissatisfied with the government's performance."129
Signs of a major schism in the ruling coalition were initially
apparent on the highest levels when in an interview with Agence
129"Ruling Coalition Takes a Drubbing," Latin American Weekly Report, p. 4, 14
February 1991, WR-91-06.
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France-Press on 3 September 1990, First Vice President Arias
Calderon accused members of other parties in the governing coalition
of collaborating with Noriega allies and stated that the coal'tion
government was in danger of falling apart. 130 In August at a party
leadership meeting, First Vice President Arias Calderon, the top
Christian Democratic Party leader asserted that the government of
President Guillermo Endara required urgent changes. While
reaffirming PDC loyalty to the government, Arias Calderon stated that
if momentum toward democracy were lost, the PDC would consider
withdrawing from the government.1 3 1
Intergovernmental tensions have led to serious confrontation;
Colon Governor Jose Huc of Endara's Arnulfista Party suspended
Christian Democratic Mayor Alcibiades Gonzalez for 20 days,
prompting the mayor to reject the suspension and declare himself in a
state of rebellion against the governor. President Endara has publicly
challenged the PDC to follow through with its threat to secede from
the coalition. In April 1991, Panama's Institutional Protection
Service (equivalent to the U.S. Secret Service), publicly searched and
disarmed Vice President Arias Calderon and his bodyguards as they
arrived at the presidential palace for a cabinet meeting. 13 2 The
incident was perceived by many as clear provocation for the PDC to
13 0Catto, William, p. 1.
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"PDC Calls for Change in Endara Government," Circuito RPC Television in
Spanish 1 August 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin
America, p. 42, FBIS LAT 90-151, 6 August 1990.
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leave the government. Earlier in 1991, Endara's controversial new
wife publicly accused the Christian Democrats of conspiring to
destabilize the government.
Adding to the turmoil, Endara was accused of setting up a
clandestine "spy" agency, Consejo de Seguridad Publica y Defensa
Nacional, in the presidency, and appointing a former senior Noriega
official to run it. Claiming the agency was illegal, the National
Assembly created a special legislative commission to investigate the
agency. The National Assembly claimed to be the sole entity able to
authorize the existence of a spy agency. Endara pointed out that the
agency had been created using the same emergency powers he had
utilized to authorize the recount of the Norega-annulled 1989
elections. The implication to the legislative commission was that if
the spy agency was illegal, so was the mandate of all the legislators
in the National Assembly. Local newspapers also alleged that the spy
agency had been allocated a $2 million budget, and its 100 members
were being advised by the CIA, Taiwanese, and Venezuelan
intelligence services.133
Endara is also accused of links to the drug trade, as the PRD
produced an affidavit signed by a DEA agent linking Endara to money
laundering. Faced with similar charges in the past, Endara was
cleared of any wrongdoing in 1990. The new DEA affidavit links
Endara's law firm as the Panamanian agent of a money laundering
133
"Endara Attacked Over 'Spy' Agency," Latin American Weekly Report, p. 11,
WR-91 -04.
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consortium of international companies. 134 Finally Endara has been
charged by the PDC of secretly purchasing arms abroad for Partido
Arnulfista supporters. Endara countered this by providing documents
implicating PDC members in arms purchases abroad as well. Armed
altercations between political parties at the minimum would
necessitate Public Force involvement in politics merely through the
maintenance of order.
Toward the end of April 1991, President Endara reshuffled his
cabinet, resulting in the exclusion of the Christian Democrats.135
Endara justified his move by blaming the PDC's "overbearing attitude"
and constant opposition to government policies as leaving him no
choice. While MOLIRENA remains with the coalition, it was not
rewarded for past loyalty. Three of the vacated cabinet seats instead
went to Endara's PA, two to the PLA and one to an "independent." The
implications, however, are significant as the PDC still retains its
majority in the Nationa; Assembly. The PDC holds 28 seats in the
National Assembly, versus 27 for the government coalition. The
Torrijista PRD possesses 10 and its PALA allies have two. Thus the
PRD is the swing vote essential to passage of legislation in the
National Assembly. 13 6  An Endara spokesman confirmed that an
arrangement with the PRD is being sought, but the PRD reportedly is
134
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not interested in a long term alliance, and prefers accommodation
only on a case by case, vote by vote basis.
The new controlling position of the PRD has potentially positive
implications for the Public Force as an institution and as a potential
political actor. The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), formed in
1978, was to incorporate and guide the numerous political groups that
had been supporting the military regime. The PRD was intended to be
the successor in a tradition of official government political parties in
Panama. It was mainly via the PRD that the military derived
legitimate political support. According to its declaration of
principles, the PRD was democratic, multi-class, nationalistic,
revolutionary, popular and independent. Its primary mission was to
continue the goals of the 1968 coup through coopting and inclusion of
business groups, organized labor, peasants, professionals, teachers,
public employees, women and youth, under different fronts of the PRD.
The PRD's ties to the military government were extremely close.
Similar to the institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico,
the PRD did not give the government a monopoly over party activity,
but rather ensured close political collaboration between the military,
government, and party leaders aimed at controlling the political
opposition. 13 7  Like the military institution, the PRD suffered an
institutional breakdown and crisis of legitimacy during the Noriega
years. Under Torrijos the PRD had symbolized reforms and
progressive socioeconomic and political changes for Panama. Under
137Panamanian Politics, pp. 80-81.
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Noriega, the party became associated with being the mouthpiece of a
brutal, corrupt, repressive dictatorship. Due to growing opposition in
PRD sectors the alliance between the PRD and military had become
problematic. Military liaison officers had to be assigned to PRD
organizations and politicians by Noriega to ensure that voting was
consistent with approved military positions.
Since the invasion, the PRD has been severely weakened. Several
key members and former leaders are either in exile or in hiding. While
a significant remainder of hardline elements continue to reject any
dealings with the new civilian government, other members have
recognized the legitimacy of the new government and assumed office
as full-fledged opposition legislators in the National Assembly. In
order to achieve some credibility with its former constituents, much
of the post-invasion PRD has moved to disassociate itself from
Noriega, but not necessarily the Public Force. Some prominent PRD
members such as Ernesto Perez Balladares, the party's former
coordinator, and Jorge Ritter, Noriega's former foreign minister,
personally met with President Endara to announce formation of the
PRD as an opposition political party aimed at strengthening Panama's
democracy through political participation. 138
Despite its new determining political role, internal divisions as
well threaten to destroy the remaining elements of the PRD. Those
who express desire for real change are accused of treason, and PRD
138
"PRD Leaders Meet With President Endara," on Circuito RPC Television in
Spanish 8 January 1990, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin
America, p. 39, FBIS LAT 90-006, 9 January 1990.
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rank and file members who continue to work for the new government
are expelled from the party. 13 9 A leftist faction under the leadership
of members in exile in Mexico are allegedly attempting to take control
of the party, while other members including former PRD presidential
candidate in the 1989 election, Carlos Duque, are attempting to
publicly distance themselves from their previous dealings with
Noriega. With the mutually beneficial relationship between the PRD
and the military institution weakened and in disarray, and both
institutions in the process of rebuilding and reorganization, new
rooting in Torrijismo could lead to joint endeavors in the future. But
with the npofessionalization of the Public Force, a renewed Public
Force-PRD relationship could undermine efforts to consolidate
civilian rule.
Since the invasion, Panama has been in a new period of civilian
politics. Without dominance by the military, political parties are
bitterly competing to advance their political agenda in the new
political environment. One extreme is that partisan civilian politics
has weakened consolidation of civilian rule by breaking up Endara's
ruling coalition. On the other extreme, the PRD representing groups
excluded from the political process before Torrijismo, now controls
the crucial swing vote determining national legislation. With the
deterioration of the Endara coalition, the traditional nexus of a
139
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strengthened Public Force and PRD could well result in a political
role for the Public Force.
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Vl. THE PUBLIC FORCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Monitoring of and assistance to the U.S. installed government in
Panama since the invasion has created a difficult policy dilemma for
the United States with regard to the Public Force. Endara's civilian
government remains dependent on U.S. troops in Panama for internal
security and domestic political stability. Meanwhile, the Public
Force, which is being trained to assume those duties, is feared to be
the civilian government's most formidable threat. Since the invasion,
the United States has provided training and equipment for the Public
Force and has provided military support to assist the Public Force in
carrying out its police functions. In December 1990, U.S. troops
intervened to put down a mutiny by Public Force members that could
well have toppled the Endara government. The United States is caught
in the middle, as the fulcrum between continued civilian rule or
Public Force political intervention. As U.S. troops must withdraw
from Panama by the year 2000, long-term civilian government
dependence on U.S. troops is unfeasible. U.S. policy must eventually
make a choice to either remain involved in or withdraw from exerting
direct influence in domestic Panamanian politics.
In February 1991, Congress approved funds for the training and
equipping of the Public Force. The legislation approved up to $1.2
million for both judicial and police training under an Administration
of Justice program, and approved previously obligated military
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assistance funds estimated at $9.3 million to procure law
enforcement equipment. 140  Funds for lethal equipment is limited to
$500,000. An unspecified portion of $420 million appropriated by
Congress in May 1991 will also be spent on bolstering and training the
Public Force; not more than $5 million of the funds may be spent for
the procurement of non-lethal law enforcement equipment. 14 1 By April
1990, more than a dozen professional U.S. trainers, mainly former
F.B.I. agents, had arrived in Panama under the Administration of
Justice's International Criminal Investigations and Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP).
The political options for the Public Force appear to be limited.
They range from the relative extremes of a genuinely apolitical Public
Force totally divorced from civilian politics on one end, to a return to
military dictatorship on the other. Torrijismo, in the form of a Public
Force-PRD alliance, represents a third alternative. In a country where
civilian dominance of politics has meant political exclusion of other
civilian constituencies, Torrijismo continues to represent the only
politically inclusive movement in Panamanian history.
While the ideal focus of U.S. policy should be the option embodying
an apolitical Public Force, the United States should recognize that the
current political situation in Panama makes this option unlikely.
Given the positive legacy of Torrijismo, U.S. policy must account for a
14 0SuIlivan, Mark, "Panama-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress," Congressional
Research Service Issue Brief, p. 10, The Library of Congress, 1890044, 22 March 1991.
1 4 11bid.
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movement towards Torrijismo within the Public Force and
Panamanian society. While Torrijismo was hardly benign, its negative
aspects remain overshadowed by its positive achievements. Under
Torrijismo more money was put into national health, education, and
rural infrastructure than in any other period of Panamanian history.
Torrijismo was responsible for the political inclusion of all
previously excluded groups as well as legislation leading to the
existence of a pluralistic political system including disparate
political parties. Torrijismo's implementation of liberal banking
laws coupled with political stability resulted in the one of the most
economically prosperous and stable periods of Panamanian history.
Perhaps most noteworthy was Torrijismo's negotiation of the Panama
Canal Treaties with the United States. The most serious allegations
against Torrijismo remain corruption in government, a practice which
preceded Torrijos, and exile of political opponents. The abuses and
excesses attributed to the military dictatorship such as violent
political repression, disappearances, and deaths all occurred during
Noriega's tenure.
While many fear a return to Torrijismo will result in an eventual
return to a Noriega-style military dictatorship, the possibility of a
dictator arising from the Public Force is low due to the weakened
Public Force leadership. The current Torrijista leadership, especially
in the PRD, would probably move to prevent resurgence of a dictator in
order to preserve their power. In addition, the PRD suffered
diminished credibility and legitimacy due to their association with
Noriega's dictatorship and are unlikely to risk their new political
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power by supporting a dictator. Unlike the previous unequal
relationship between the PRD and the military, any PRD-Public Force
alliance in the 1990s will likely integrate the civilian political party
and the Public Force as equal partners. Within this new relationship,
PRD leaders are unlikely to subordinate themselves to the Public
Force leadership. This will make it more difficult for any one person,
civilian or Public Force member, from becoming politically
omnipotent. As such the political involvement of the Public Force
will not approach the total dominance of the PDF.
The Noriega years were not a natural outgrowth of Torrijismo.
Noriega had to resort to extreme measures to monitor and control
Panamanian life in order to maintain power. This contrasted strongly
to military rule under Torrijismo. If Torrijos ruled without severe
repression, arguably, a Noriega tenure consistent with Torrijismo
could have governed benevolently as well. In addition, had Torrijos
lived past 1981, it is questionable whether Noriega would ever have
risen to command the National Guard. Two strong contenders would
most likely have received Torrijos' endorsement before Noriega.
Torrijos' chosen successor was Colonel Ruben Dario Paredes, a loyal
Torrijista. After Paredes, any Noriega accession to commander would
probably have been successfully contested by Colonel Diaz Herrera,
Torrijos' first cousin.
It is unlikely current U.S. policy will improve chances of success
for development of an apolitical armed force in Panama. Given Latin
American sensitivities toward the U.S. involvement in their affairs,
continued U.S. presence in Panama's political-military development
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could well prove counterproductive. Favorabie agreements between
the United States and Panama regarding the Panama Canal and the U.S.
military could be construed as manipulation by the United States and
not the result of impartial negotiation. On the other hand, with
continued close U.S. involvement in Panamanian affairs, Panama may
attempt to develop policies divergent from U.S. desires in order to
prove Panamanian independence from U.S. influence.
In order to reduce the U.S. role in Panama and support development
of an apolitical armed force, training and material support of the
Public Force could be coordinated under international auspices of the
Organization of American States or the United Nations. A long-term
international training program would provide training personnel that
do not represent a single national interest, and neutralize opposition
based on national sensitivities regarding sovereignty.
U.S. policy in relation to the Public Force should not focus on an
exclusive U.S.-Panamanian relationship, with the United States as
mentor and Panama as the student. Recent events have proven the
limitations of U.S. influence on Panama's armed institution. They have
also demonstrated the difficulty of rooting U.S. values, such as the
concept of an apolitical military. The current mentor and financing
role played by the United States would better serve Panamanian and
U.S. interests in the long term if delegated to a politically neutral,
international agency. Traditional U.S. dominance leaves open the
possibility that the Public Force would take advantage of a close
relationship with the United States to pursue parochial political
interests instead of apolitical, public service.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This thesis examines the prospects for a successful transition of
the PDF to an apolitical Public Force. The transition is crucial for
Panama in that the success or failure will directly influence the
demilitarization of Panamanian politics as well as the con tinued
survival of civilian rule. However, since its inception, the Public
Force has been affected by serious problems that have implications
for its apolitical development.
Created as an armed organization in the chaotic aftermath of the
U.S. invasion, the Public Force complement of ex-PDF members is
confronting a serious crisis of legitimacy. Civilian suspicion,
mistrust, and fear of the Public Force are based on the perception that
the Public Force is the PDF reconstituted, intent on eventually staging
a coup to reinstate military rule. This insecurity with the Public
Force exists even in the civilian government, resulting in lack of
support for the Public Force.
As a result, the Public Force has been unable and increasingly less
willing to perform its public service duties. Public Force morale and
institutional cohesion is poor. Low esteem from the population and
material weaknesses from deficient government funding make
maintenance of law and order extremely difficult. Normal police work
is increasingly life-threatening as arms constraints on the Public
Force leave them outgunned by criminal elements. Morale is further
109
debilitated by the institutional disarray of the Public Force. Formerly
the most institutionalized and cohesive of government entities and
indeed of Panamanian society, the Public Force has been reduced to a
severely weakened, subordinated position.
However, this weakness and disarray is only temporary. With
professionalization a necessary part of any armed organization, the
Public Force is seeking to re-establish its institutional identity
rooted in Torrijismo. Torrijismo remains especially appealing for the
Public Force as it is remembered for creating the greatest period of
political and military power, institutional cohesion, legitimacy, and
prestige for Panama's armed institution. Through Torrijismo, the
armed institution occupied the apex of Panamanian life and served as
the transmission belt of popular demands, and the engine of national
progress. Torrijismo negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties, was
responsible for health, education, and housing development projects,
social reform, and political inclusion of Panama's marginalized and
excluded segments of the population. In contrast, the Noriega years
are bitterly rejected as the cause of the current weakness and
disarray of the Public Force.
From the institutional perspective, Torrijismo provides renewed
momentum for the aspiration for more than police duties in the Public
Force. In light of the upcoming Panamanian assumption of the
Panama Canal's security, a more military mission for the Public Force
gains credence. Article V of the Treaty Concerning Permanent
Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal states that:
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After termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, only the Republic
of Panama shall operate the Canal and maintain military forces,
defense sites, and military installations within its national
territory.1 42
Herein lies the major obstacle of the Public Force transition to an
apolitical, police force. The Public Force is not a military force and
is unable to carry out duties stipulated by the treaty. For Panama to
fulfill its treaty obligations, a more military organization must be
developed. With a more military mission and an institution imbued
with the military and social legacy of Torrijismo, a cohesive and
strengthened Public Force will probably not settle for subordination
to weak, elitist civilian governments. Without development of strong
civilian government institutions in Panama, the Public Force may be
forced to play a political role in government, as its strongest and
most cohesive member.
The patronage character of civilian Panamanian politics may also
serve to pull the Public Force into political participation. The
weakness of the civilian government does not augur well for the
strengthening of civilian government institutions. The collapse of the
ruling coalition in April 1991 has the dominant Christian Democratic
Party as part of the opposition. The increasing unpopularity of the
Endara government has ironically made Torrijismo's vanguard party,
the PRD, the determining bloc in Panamanian politics. One possibility
is the establishment of a new Torrijista alliance between the Public
Force and the PRD. Another possibility is the forging of an
142Panama: A Country Study, p. 290.
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accommodation between the Public Force and the Christian Democrats
under Arias Calderon. As Minister of Government and Justice, Arias
Calderon installed his own civilian bureaucracy to run the Public
Force, and had been accused of becoming the Public Force's civilian
caudillo. Finally, faced with disintegration, the Endara government
may grant concessions to the Public Force in return for maintaining
Endara in power.
Despite the defeat of Panamanian militarism, the legacy of
Torrijismo plays a role in Panama through the Public Force. The
reestablishment of Torrijismo in the Public Force institutional
identity will result in a strengthened and more cohesive Public Force.
In several ways, and for a variety of reasons, the Public Force may
again be politicized. Whatever the outcome, Torrijismo's legacy in
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